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Despite temporal changes in wholesale electricity prices, retail prices are typically 
constant throughout the day. To address this economic inefficiency, Detroit Edison, a 
subsidiary of DTE Energy (DTE), can introduce residential dynamic pricing rates to incent 
customers to shift load away from peak periods, at which time wholesale electricity prices 
are high. This paper estimates the financial and environmental impacts of implementing 
dynamic electricity pricing rates for residential customers within the Midwest Independent 
System Operator (MISO). Based on these estimates, we recommend that DTE pilot specific 
residential dynamic pricing rates, all of which may be suitable for wide-scale deployment. 
We researched existing pricing programs that have been piloted throughout the 
country to determine which options present the most potential to reduce or shift peak load. In 
addition, we obtained cost estimates for enabling technology to be used in conjunction with 
these tariffs. We then constructed a dispatch model which simulates the MISO electricity 
market by using electricity supply and demand forecasts for 2010-2030. Applying residential 
peak load reduction and shifting estimates from previous pilots to the dispatch model, we 
calculate avoided capacity savings, avoided energy savings, and emissions impacts for 
various dynamic pricing programs. Specifically, we analyzed a Time of Use (TOU) tariff and 
TOU/Critical Peak Price tariff with and without enabling technology (smart thermostat and 
in-home display), as well as a TOU/Peak-time Rebate tariff. We investigate these tariffs 
using peak and critical-peak period window lengths ranging from four to eight hours.  
There were three central results. First, deployment of demand response programs to a 
subset of residential customers with a four-hour peak window results in financial outcomes 
ranging from a net loss of $350 million to a net gain of $400 million. Second, enabling 
technology increases peak load reduction, but technology costs may exceed the savings of the 
increased load reduction. Third, the length of the peak window is an important driver of 







We would like to thank the many individuals and groups that helped make this 
research possible. Our faculty advisor, Greg Keoleian guided us from start to finish and was 
an integral part of all aspects of the project. Doug Ziemnick at DTE acted as a mentor and 
guide and provided countless hours to help us produce this research. In addition, Doug 
provided us with key information, data, and contacts at both DTE and its vendors.  
 
A fellow MS candidate at the School of Natural Resources (SNRE), Jason McDonald, 
provided us with important load data and helped us as we developed our dispatch model. 
Former SNRE faculty member, Duncan Callaway, and former Ford School faculty member, 
Meredith Fowlie, provided us with early feedback on our pricing research and helped us to 
define the project scope. Professor Tom Lyon provided guidance on our modeling efforts. 
George Mundorf at DTE reviewed our dispatch model and helped us to understand which 
results would be of particular interest to DTE. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui and Ryan Hledik at the 
Brattle Group provided us expert tutelage as we waded through in-depth elasticity 
measurements. Dr. Bernard Neenan from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
provided us further guidance on understanding own price and substitution elasticity 
mechanics.   
 
We are grateful to the School of Natural Resources and Environment and the Erb 
Institute for providing the funding to make this research possible. Finally, we would like to 





1 Executive Summary _______________________________________________________________________ 1 
2 Introduction _______________________________________________________________________________ 5 
3 Overview of Electricity Markets and Electricity Rate Designs _________________________ 6 
3.1 The U.S. Electricity Market __________________________________________________________ 6 
3.2 Electricity in Michigan _______________________________________________________________ 6 
3.2.1 Demand Characteristics in Michigan ____________________________________________ 6 
3.2.2 Supply Characteristics in Michigan ______________________________________________ 7 
3.2.3 Utility Business Model in Michigan – How Utilities Make Money _____________ 8 
3.2.4 Current Rate Plans in the State of Michigan ____________________________________ 8 
3.3 Dynamic Pricing Rate Designs ______________________________________________________ 9 
3.3.1 Critical Peak Pricing ______________________________________________________________ 9 
3.3.2 Critical Peak Pricing Results ___________________________________________________ 10 
3.3.3 Time-of-use Pricing (TOU) _____________________________________________________ 11 
3.3.4 TOU Results ______________________________________________________________________ 12 
3.3.5 CPP/TOU Pilots __________________________________________________________________ 12 
3.3.6 CPP/TOU Results ________________________________________________________________ 12 
3.3.7 Real-Time Pricing _______________________________________________________________ 13 
3.3.8 Real Time Pricing Results ______________________________________________________ 14 
3.3.9 Peak-Time Rebate (PTR) Programs & Results ________________________________ 15 
3.3.10 Green Power Programs ______________________________________________________ 15 
4 Dynamic Pricing and Technology ______________________________________________________ 16 
5 Attributes of Successful Demand Response Programs _______________________________ 17 
5.1 Enabling Technology Improves Demand Response _____________________________ 17 
5.2 What is Enabling Technology? ____________________________________________________ 17 
5.2.1 Enabling Technology Devices __________________________________________________ 18 
5.3 Targeting High Consumption Homes May Be an Effective Strategy ___________ 18 
5.4 Larger Differential Between Peak and Off-peak Rates Leads to Greater Savings
 19 
5.5 Marketing and Education _________________________________________________________ 19 
5.6 Customer Notification _____________________________________________________________ 20 
5.7 Bill Protection ______________________________________________________________________ 20 
5.8 Experimental Design ______________________________________________________________ 20 
6 Conclusion from Literature Review and Research ___________________________________ 20 
6.1 Staggered CPP ______________________________________________________________________ 21 
6.2 CPP Subsidizing Renewable Energy ______________________________________________ 22 
6.3 TOU/CPP Block Rate Pricing ______________________________________________________ 22 
6.4 Point Rewards______________________________________________________________________ 22 
7 Analysis __________________________________________________________________________________ 23 
7.1 Overview ___________________________________________________________________________ 23 
7.2 The Model __________________________________________________________________________ 23 
7.2.1 Data and Methodology __________________________________________________________ 26 
7.2.2 Calculating Supply ______________________________________________________________ 27 
7.2.3 Calculating Demand _____________________________________________________________ 27 
7.2.4 Calculating the Cost of Generation _____________________________________________ 27 
v 
 
7.2.5 Calculating the Savings Associated with Demand Response Programs_____ 28 
7.3 Scenario Inputs ____________________________________________________________________ 29 
7.3.1 Demand-Response Program Penetration _____________________________________ 29 
7.3.2 Generation Expansion __________________________________________________________ 30 
7.3.3 Carbon Price _____________________________________________________________________ 30 
7.3.4 Program Type and Level of Demand Response _______________________________ 30 
7.3.5 Alternate Demand Response Methodology ___________________________________ 35 
7.3.6 Modeled Scenarios ______________________________________________________________ 35 
7.4 Additional Data - Defining Peak Periods and Event Days for the Model ______ 36 
8 Results ___________________________________________________________________________________ 38 
8.1 Overview ___________________________________________________________________________ 38 
8.2 Comparing Programs under Base Case Assumptions ___________________________ 39 
8.3 Changing the rate of demand-response penetration ____________________________ 41 
8.4 Level of Demand Response _______________________________________________________ 42 
8.5 Pollution Implications of Demand Response Pricing ___________________________ 43 
8.6 Impact of a 20% RPS Mandate ____________________________________________________ 45 
8.7 Effect of a Carbon Tax _____________________________________________________________ 46 
9 Conclusions and Recommendations ___________________________________________________ 48 
9.1 Summary ___________________________________________________________________________ 48 
9.2 Key Findings _______________________________________________________________________ 48 
9.3 Recommendations _________________________________________________________________ 50 
Appendix A - DTE’s Residential Rate Options ______________________________________________ 52 
Appendix B – Consumers Energy Rate Schedules __________________________________________ 56 
Appendix C - Additional Rate Structures ___________________________________________________ 57 
Appendix D – Sample Marginal Cost Curve Calculation ___________________________________ 58 
Appendix E – Summary of Results of Various Scenarios __________________________________ 59 
Appendix F - PRISM Model Simulations ____________________________________________________ 60 
Appendix G –Tariffs and Expected Demand Reductions Using Prism Simulation _______ 65 
Appendix H – Financial Modeling Results of Selected Tariffs from PRISM Simulation _ 66 














The goal of this Master’s Project is to recommend pricing pilots that our client, 
Detroit Edison, a subsidiary of DTE Energy (DTE), may implement with residential 
customers using Advance Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The ultimate goal is for DTE to 
collect data about how their customers respond to electricity prices to identify the most 
promising mechanisms suitable for wide-scale deployment. 
 Michigan is part of the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), a partially 
deregulated market in which wholesale electricity prices are determined via an auction 
process. Despite fluctuations in the cost of the electricity, the retail price is fixed and does not 
reflect real-time changes in wholesale prices. The current absence of significant price signals 
means that there may be an opportunity for DTE to implement market-based mechanisms to 
incentivize customers to shift load away from peak periods during which load is particularly 




To evaluate the ways in which DTE could send price signals to its customers, we 
researched existing pricing programs that have been piloted or implemented throughout the 
country to determine which options present the greatest potential to reduce or shift peak load. 
Specifically, we evaluated Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), Time of Use Pricing (TOU), 
combined CPP/TOU Pricing, Real Time Pricing (RTP), and Peak-Time Rebate (PTR) 
programs. Each of these tariff structures were analyzed to determine the expected demand 
shift and corresponding economic benefits associated with implementing that particular 
program. Further, we identified common trends across tariff structures that appeared to 
increase net economic benefit. We found that TOU and CPP tariffs produced the greatest 
reduction in peak demand and were often bolstered by enabling technology, such as a smart 
thermostat, and excellent notification practices for peak event days. In addition, we looked 
outside of the electricity industry to determine other methods that companies have used to 
influence customer behavior, including point rewards programs and product giveaways; such 
programs would be new and innovative if applied in the electricity industry. 
 From this research, we presented eleven dynamic pricing programs to DTE that have 
the potential to incent customers to change their electricity consumption patterns. In 
consultation with DTE, we focused on three of these programs for in-depth analysis: TOU, 
TOU/CPP, and TOU/PTR. Each of these pricing structures was evaluated with and without 
the use of enabling technology. Narrowing the scope was necessary due to the intensive 
nature of the additional analysis, which consisted of constructing a dispatch model using 
estimates of electricity supply and demand from 2010-2030, estimating potential shifts and 
reductions in electricity load resulting from implementation of the pricing program, and 
running the model to calculate electricity load and price for each hour of each day over this 
twenty-year period. Load differences between a “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario and the 
scenarios incorporating load shifts from dynamic pricing were used to calculate potential 
savings in both energy costs and avoided capacity costs resulting from consumers responding 








Deployment of demand response programs to a subset of residential customers with a 
four-hour peak window will result in financial outcomes ranging from a net loss of $350 
million for a TOU tariff with technology to a net gain of $400 million for a TOU/CPP tariff 
without enabling technology. $400 million represents a savings of less than 0.25% of total 
wholesale electricity costs and less than 1% of the residential portion of total wholesale 
electricity costs. TOU with enabling technology and TOU/CPP with enabling technology will 
result in the largest cost savings for DTE resulting in a cost reduction of approximately 
0.30% of total wholesale electricity costs. However, if DTE must bear the cost of enabling 
technology, the cost savings of these programs are negative (i.e. a financial loss), changing to 
-0.14% of total energy costs. In this case, combined TOU/CPP and TOU/PTR programs offer 
the greatest cost savings to DTE. Therefore, DTE should strongly consider the option of 
incorporating the costs of enabling technology into its rate-base, or having customers 
contribute to the cost if it wishes to proceed with deployment of enabling technology.  
These results are highly sensitive to the four-hour peak period used in many of the 
scenarios we modeled. In the deployment of a CPP/TOU with technology program, the hours 
adjacent to the 1:00 pm - 5:00 pm window become the peak hours once a sufficient number 
of customers are enrolled in demand-response pricing. Once this occurs, annual avoided 
capacity savings are very limited. In addition, avoided capacity savings will be diminished 
with further deployment of demand-response pricing because further demand-response 
pricing will further increase peak demand in the time periods adjacent to 1:00 pm – 5:00pm. 
As a result, there are diminishing avoided capacity gains with additional demand response 
penetration. 
Financial returns to demand response pricing are also sensitive to the level of demand 
response. Modeling of various demand response scenarios (low, medium, and high) shows 
that the savings can range by more than $100M over the course of the twenty-year period 
evaluated. While predictions can be made using the price elasticities of DTE’s customer 
base, wide variations of responses in previous studies indicate that this may be a challenging 
exercise.  
Demand response tariffs may decrease emissions within MISO according to our 
model. This is likely due to the fact that for the majority of days in MISO, peak demand is 
actually served by coal generation facilities. This result is supported by FERC’s classification 
of coal as a marginal fuel type, as well as baseload, within MISO. Thus shifting electricity 
consumption from peak to off-peak periods is actually shifting generation to a more efficient, 
relatively cleaner coal facility. This effect, coupled with pricing-induced conservation from 
demand response, appears to offset the increase in pollution from demand response on those 
days when peak load is served by natural gas generation. 
The model was used to test how policy changes within MISO and the US might affect 
DTE’s savings. We found that the savings from residential demand response programs are 
not sensitive to whether a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) within MISO shapes future 
generation capacity expansion. This outcome is explained by MISO’s electricity demand. 
Rarely does demand approach the steep, expensive part of the supply curve within MISO 





A carbon tax increases the financial impact of demand-response pricing. Because coal 
is typically the marginal plant in MISO, the carbon tax actually magnifies the financial gains 
from demand-response pricing by making the supply curve steeper. This increase in financial 
impact more than offsets the reduction in financial gain (due to the reduced spread in cost 




1. Combined TOU and CPP programs with or without enabling technology 
provide the greatest demand response in the residential electricity market. A 
review of previous combined TOU and CPP programs found that they resulted in 
mean critical peak hour demand reductions of 36% when coupled with enabling 
technology and 17% without technology. 
2. Enabling technology substantially improves customer demand response but 
may not provide adequate economic returns to the utility if the utility bears 
the full cost of the technology. Our modeling forecasted gross cost savings (i.e. 
ignoring enabling technology costs) of $572 million for deployment of a TOU 
tariff with enabling technology compared to savings of $105 million for a TOU 
tariff without technology using a four-hour peak period. Similarly, our modeling 
found cost savings of $633 million for deployment of a TOU/CPP tariff with 
enabling technology compared to savings of $399 million for a TOU/CPP tariff 
without technology using a four-hour peak period. However, we found the cost of 
deployment of enabling technology to be $925 million, which is greater than the 
additional cost savings captured by using enabling technologies.       
3. Costs savings to the utility are dominated by avoided capacity savings. The 
average breakdown of cost savings for all rate structures modeled was 
approximately 80% and 20% for avoided capacity and avoided energy savings, 
respectively.   
4. The length of the CPP window is an important driver in the overall cost 
savings. Increasing the peak and critical peak period window length from four 
hours (1:00 pm–5:00 pm) to five hours (12:00pm – 5:00pm) shifted the range of 
financial outcomes of various demand response tariffs. The range of outcomes for 
the four-hour window ranged from a net loss of $300 million for a TOU tariff 
with technology to a net gain of $400 million for a TOU/CPP tariff without 
technology, whereas the economic outcomes from the five-hour window ranged 
from a net loss of $50 million for a TOU tariff with technology to a net gain of 
$450 million for a CPP/TOU tariff without technology. Note that aside from the 
differences in peak hour window lengths, these scenarios use base-case 
assumptions detailed in the Section 8.2. 
5. Deployment of demand response programs with a four-hour peak window to 
a subset of residential customers will result in cost savings of  less than 
approximately 0.25% of total wholesale electricity costs and 1% of the 









1. DTE should run ProMod with the demand response tariffs and their 
corresponding estimated reductions that produced the greatest economic 
benefits. While we are confident that our results provide a useful estimate of the 
potential range of economic impacts from dynamic pricing programs, it would be 
helpful to compare those results to those from a more sophisticated model such as 
ProMod.  
2. Model potential savings under a scenario in which demand growth continued 
at historical averages since 2008. The economic downturn moved MISO away 
from the very steep parts of the supply curve, which significantly reduces the 
economic savings from demand response programs. Analysis with greater overall 
off-peak and peak demand would provide information about potential savings 
from demand response if electricity consumption rapidly recovers to pre-recession 
levels. This scenario could yield substantially different results 
3. DTE should use its pilots to test customer response to various dynamic 
pricing structures, various rates within those structures, and various peak 
window lengths. There is significant uncertainty around the level of demand 
response that DTE’s customers will exhibit under dynamic pricing tariffs. Pilots 
give DTE the opportunity to test for many different variables and track in detail 
how its customers will respond and the corresponding economic benefit DTE will 
reap in a large scale deployment of AMIs and dynamic pricing tariffs.  
4. DTE should test 2 and 3 hour CPP windows with higher differentials to test 
the viability of a staggered CPP tariff. We believe this tariff represents an 
opportunity for DTE to distinguish itself as a cutting edge utility while benefiting 








Unlike oil or gas, electricity cannot easily be stored, which means that electricity 
must be generated and delivered at the precise moment it is needed – supply must always 
equal demand. In addition to simply meeting demand, electricity providers must maintain 
capacity margins, or supply that can be quickly brought on-line in the event of equipment 
failure or during periods of peak demand. This capacity margin is met by maintaining 
generation facilities that are only used during a few hours of peak demand throughout the 
year. For example, in most parts of the United States, approximately 10% of total system 
capacity is used for only 80-100 hours per year, or less than 1% of the time.1 Not 
surprisingly, servicing peak periods is expensive because the facilities used to meet this 
demand sit idle for most of the year. The cost of servicing peak demand is illustrated by a 
Brattle group estimate that a 5% reduction in U.S. peak demand would result in $35 billion in 
savings from avoided construction of generation capacity over a twenty-year period.2
Unfortunately, the need for expensive peak generation capacity is increasing because 
demand during peak periods is growing faster than overall demand. From 2000 to 2007, 
electricity demand increased 1.1% per year,
  
3 while average summertime electricity demand 
increased by 1.72% per year.4
Most current residential electricity rate structures do not reflect the cost difference of 
supplying electricity in peak versus off-peak hours.  Therefore, the customer has no market 
incentive to adjust his or her pattern of electricity consumption. Dynamic-pricing programs 
that charge higher electricity prices during periods of peak demand may be effective tools to 
shift electricity consumption to off-peak hours.  
 This discrepancy between the growth of overall demand and 
peak demand presents a challenge for utilities. However, there are opportunities for utilities 
to mitigate the impact of this trend.  
To address the challenge of the growing divergence between peak and off-peak 
electricity demand, DTE is interested in developing pilot programs to determine the potential 
of using various pricing mechanisms to change consumer demand. The goal of this Master’s 
Project is to recommend dynamic pricing programs that our client, DTE Energy, may 
implement with residential customers using Advance Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The 
ultimate goal is for DTE to learn more about how their consumers respond to electricity 
prices and identify the most promising mechanisms suitable for wide-scale deployment. 
Dynamic pricing programs will also have longer term impacts as plug in hybrid 
electric vehicles (PHEVs) become prevalent throughout DTE’s service territory. These types 
of pricing programs and the charging times for PHEVs provide another opportunity to 
address the growing disparity between peak and off-peak demand. For example, in an 
analysis of the potential impacts of PHEVs in 2020 and 2030 in 13 regions of the United 
States, Oak Ridge National Lab researchers found that charging PHEVs at 10 p.m. instead of 





3 Overview of Electricity Markets and Electricity Rate Designs 
3.1 The U.S. Electricity Market  
 
In the U.S., electricity service is provided to residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers by investor owned and public (i.e. municipal) utilities. These companies may own 
generation assets that provide electricity to their customers and/or buy electricity from 
independent power producers (IPPs). 
Understanding the wholesale electricity market is important to understanding the 
partially deregulated structure of U.S. electricity markets, including Michigan’s. Historically, 
U.S. electricity markets were entirely vertically integrated, meaning a monopoly utility 
owned the generation assets, transmission and distribution lines (T&D), and meters in 
customers’ homes. Because utilities earned a fixed rate of return on assets, there was concern 
that utilities were over-capitalized with unnecessary assets. In addition, because customers 
were charged average rates, there was rarely any connection between the retail price of 
electricity and the marginal cost of generation.6
The perceived problems with vertically integrated companies, combined with high 
electricity prices in the 1980s, led to an initiative to deregulate the electricity industry. The 
result of deregulation in many parts of the country, including Michigan, is that an 
Independent System Operator (ISO) now controls the electricity markets and dispatches 
power plants based on locational marginal prices (LMPs). This means the lowest-cost, base-
load power plants are deployed first, with higher-cost generation facilities coming online as 
demand increases. Utilities that procure power from third parties pay the market clearing 





3.2 Electricity in Michigan 
 
There are three distinct components to the electricity market in the Midwest, which is 
managed by the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO). There is a day-ahead energy 
market, a real-time energy market, and a financial transmission rights market (FTR). Buyers 
and sellers meet on these markets, and MISO oversees the process while ensuring that energy 
supply is secure and reliable. The day-ahead market is the primary market on which load is 
scheduled. Buyers and sellers submit bids and offers for each hour of the day at various 
nodes throughout the transmission network. Sellers receive the market-clearing price (the 
LMP), meaning that if the last generating unit needed to meet demand offered their 
electricity at $60 per megawatt hour (MWh), all sellers would receive that price and all 
buyers would pay that price. The real-time market serves to smooth any imbalances, with 
locational marginal prices clearing every five minutes.8
 
 
3.2.1 Demand Characteristics in Michigan 
 
Within DTE’s service territory, peak energy demand is growing more rapidly than 





serving this peak demand is very costly.9 Unfortunately, 1) the price elasticity of demand for 
electricity is very low10
 
 and 2) rates do not reflect real-time LMPs. This means that 
consumers, with low-price elasticity, receive limited price signals regarding actual electricity 
costs. Furthermore, just as on-peak users pay less than the real-time LMPs, off-peak users 
generally are paying more per kWh than the LMP. This means that, in effect, off-peak energy 
use subsidizes on-peak consumption.  
3.2.2 Supply Characteristics in Michigan 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the geographic 
dispersion of Michigan’s various electricity 
supply sources and details the contribution 
of those sources to overall supply.11 
Michigan derives approximately 3/5 of its 
electricity from coal plants, and an 
additional 1/4 from nuclear generators, 
both of which primarily serve as base-load 
power sources. Most of the remaining 
demand, much of which comes at peak 
times, is met by natural gas power plants. 
Michigan also has a large number of hydro-
electric and landfill gas resources.12
Michigan is no different than many 
parts of the country in that the marginal 
price of electricity increases dramatically 
during peak periods. 
 
Figure 2 below is 
specific to California, but it illustrates just 
how expensive it is to service peak 
demand.13










Figure 2 - Supply Characteristics in Michigan 






3.2.3 Utility Business Model in Michigan – How Utilities Make Money 
 
Investor owned utilities in Michigan earn money based on a fixed rate of return on 
equity agreed to by the Michigan Public Service Commission. DTE customers, for example, 
pay for all costs associated with generating and delivering electricity plus a fixed rate of 
return. Consumer prices are set in a manner that seeks to ensure cost recovery as well as a 
return on equity.  
 
3.2.4 Current Rate Plans in the State of Michigan 
 
In Michigan, nine investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and nine cooperatives serve over 4 
million customers.14 DTE and Consumers Energy, the two largest providers in the state, 
serve more than 87% of these customers and account for more than 88% of state electricity 
revenues.15
DTE serves the majority of its customers with a traditional rate structure. The most 
popular plan consists of a monthly service charge, and a two-tiered rate per kWh. The first 
17kWh per day, averaged over one month, costs 6.726¢ and each additional kWh costs 
8.136¢. In addition to this standard plan, DTE also offers several other rate structures 
including plans with seasonal pricing, on-peak and off-peak pricing, and utility interruptible 
service. However, these plans serve only a small fraction of customers. The current time-of-
day program, for example, is only available to 10,000 customers. An advance electricity 
meter is required for these time-of-day rates. Details of these plans can be found in appendix 
A.  
 
In addition to these rate plans, DTE offers a renewable energy option called Green 
Currents. Enrollees in this plan ensure that their electricity is supplied by renewable wind and 
biomass energy sources. Customers can choose to receive 100% of their electricity from 
renewable energy sources for a premium of 2 ¢ per kWh, or they can purchase 100 kWh 
blocks of renewable energy for $2.50. As of January 2010, DTE had enrolled over 18,300 
customers in this program, well above initial expectations of 4,000.16
The second largest supplier of electricity in the state is Consumers Energy. Unlike 
DTE, the standard rate plan for Consumers has seasonal price differentials. From October to 
May, customers pay 4.7517 ¢ per kWh for all electricity consumption. During the peak 
demand months from June to September, consumers pay 4.7517 ¢ for the first 600 kWh per 
month and 8.4687 ¢ for each additional kWh of electricity. Consumers Energy also offers a 
time-of-use rate program, but this rate is limited to just 10,000 customers. Details of 
Consumers Energy rate plans can be found in Appendix B.   
 
Like DTE, Consumers Energy offers a renewable energy option called Renewable 
Resource Program. Consumers may procure all of their electricity from renewable sources 
for an additional 1.667 ¢ per kWh or purchase 150 kWh blocks of renewable energy for 
$2.50 each. 
Customers that purchase more than 100 blocks of renewable energy a month receive a 
bulk rate of $2.00 per 150 kWh. 
In addition to the major electricity producers, several of the smaller electricity 





of-use service with two different peak and off-peak time windows. The utility also has a 
program in which they install a peak interrupter on heaters, air conditioners, or water heaters. 
A selection of rate plans from other utilities can be found in Appendix C. 
 
3.3 Dynamic Pricing Rate Designs 
3.3.1 Critical Peak Pricing 
 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) is a fairly new rate program being offered by various 
utilities throughout the country. CPP tariffs are, in essence, a form of TOU programs except 
that CPP is even more targeted. Instead of daily on-peak times as in TOU rate structures, the 
on-peak times are limited to just a few days per year when demand is expected to be highest, 
such as during heat waves when the entire population runs their air conditioning unit. The 
primary goal of the program is to shift load from on-peak to off-peak hours on these peak 
demand days. CPP rate plans typically designate a specific time window for the CPP tariff, 
such as between 2pm and 7pm, and limit the number of event days, typically 6 to 15 per year, 
that may be called so as to not create undue hardship for the customer. Participants in this 
rate program are offered discounted power during off-peak hours in return for being charged 
much higher rates during critical hours. CPP on-peak rates typically range between 400% and 
700% of the off-peak electricity rate.17
In the case of PG&E’s CPP program, customers pay three times their base tariff 
between noon and 3pm on event days, and five times their base tariff between 3 and 6pm. 
PG&E has a separate but related program named “SmartRate” in which residential customers 
pay an additional $.60/kWh on top of their off-peak tariff for all electricity used during peak-
hours on an event day. Customers receive a $.03/kWh credit for electricity used during non-
peak hours on non-event days for the months June through September.
 This disparity between the prices in off-peak and 
critical-peak hours is designed to create the financial incentive to reduce electricity 
consumption during extremely high demand days. A review of CPP programs indicates that 
this pricing structure has been the most effective at shifting demand during critical peak 
periods. 
18
The SmartRate program was advertised to customers via direct mail; over 135,000 
customers were notified, and 10,000 enrolled within three months. Customers were given a 
$50 visa card as an incentive to enroll early and were offered bill protection to guarantee 
them an annual bill of no more than the previous year. Once enrolled, customers were sent a 
welcome kit, energy saving tips, and a confirmation letter. Specifically, customers were 
given methods for both reducing their overall load and shifting it from on-peak to off-peak.
 
19
An interesting point to note about this program is that a disproportionately high number of 
low-income households enrolled. In addition, it is important to note each household’s annual 
electricity consumption. Those homes with high consumption are also those that are more 
easily able to displace and reduce loads on event days. Some high-consumption households 
reduced their demand by five times more than did low-consumption homes.
 
20 However, 
while high-use consumers are able to displace load more effectively than low-use consumers, 
it was the low-use consumers that saved considerably more on a percentage basis on their 
annual electric bill.21 Customers in the high-use group that earned less than $50K/year saw 5-





particularly healthy segment to target because of their ability to be offered substantial savings 
while displacing large amounts of load.22
On average, residential customers decreased their load, as compared to a reference 
baseline, by .4 kW on event days, amounting to a 16.6% decrease in load. As expected, 
customer electricity consumption shifted out of the 2 p.m. – 7 p.m. range.
 
23 Figure 3 See  for 





3.3.2 Critical Peak Pricing Results 
 
 The pilot pricing programs implemented by the three largest California utilities in 
2003 and 2004 included a CPP plan. Under the CPP plan consumers paid 59¢/kWh during 
event periods compared with 13¢/kWh under a standard rate plan. The pilot resulted in 
demand reduction during event periods of just less than 13% in 2003 and reduction of almost 
14% in 2004.24
 A 2006 Xcel Energy pricing pilot also included a CPP rate structure. The actual 
pricing of CPP electricity is not published in the literature, but results of the pilot showed a 
demand reduction between 31% and 45% during critical peak periods.
     
25
 In 2006 and 2007, PSE&G conducted a pricing pilot study that bundled CPP and 
TOU together. A discussion of bundled rate programs will be discussed in more detail in a 
following section, but the results of this pilot demonstrate the effectiveness of CPP in 
reducing peak demand. Under the program, customers were charged 4¢ for off-peak 
consumption, 17¢ for on-peak consumption, and 69¢ for critical peak consumption. In 2007, 
the rate for critical peak electricity was increased even further to $1.45 per kWh. The results 
of the pilot estimated that the TOU rates were responsible for a 3%-6% reduction in demand 
during peak events, while the CPP rate was responsible for an additional 14% reduction. 
Thus, total reductions were between 17% and 20% during critical peak periods. When 
coupled with a communicating programmable thermostat, demand reductions were 21% due 
to TOU rates and 26% for CPP rates for a total reduction of 47%.
 The observed 
demand reduction was even greater when the CPP program was bundled with a TOU tariff 
structure and a programmable communicating thermostat. 
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 A concern about critical peak pricing programs is how customers will respond to 
multiple CPP days in a row. Since high demand days are typically associated with heat wave 
events, it is often the case that utilities face consecutive critical event days. Customers may 
develop fatigue after multiple event days and not reduce demand as much at the end of a 
sequence of critical demand days. However, history indicates that the opposite is observed. A 
review of PG&E’s Smart Rate Tariff program found that customers were actually better at 
shifting load on the third day of each event cycle than on the prior two days.27
These pilots are just a few of the many CPP pilots that have been implemented to 
date. Each demonstrates the effectiveness of CPP pricing to reduce peak demand. The data 




3.3.3 Time-of-use Pricing (TOU) 
 
Time-of-use (TOU) pricing structures have sprung up all over the country as a result 
of improved metering infrastructure. Meters are now capable of monitoring not only how 
much energy is used, but also when it is used. Utilities have taken advantage of this new 
technology and created a residential pricing plan to encourage electricity usage during off-
peak hours and to discourage electricity usage during on-peak hours. For example, Baltimore 
Gas and Electric (BGE) offers a program with five different rates based on when electricity is 
consumed (see Figure 4 below). The tariff structure provides electricity at a rate of 
10.321¢/kWh from 7-10am 
and 8-11pm, and 
9.305¢/kWh between 
11pm and 7am. The 
savings over the non-TOU 
rate of 11.83¢/kWh creates 
incentives for homeowners 
to use their electricity 
during these time periods. 
For weekdays between 
10am and 8pm, 
homeowners are charged 
15¢/kWh, creating a 
substantial incentive to 
refrain from consuming 
during that time period.28
One commonly 
stated shortcoming of TOU rates is its 
inability to create additional incentives 
 
Overall, the goal is to 
flatten the load curve by 
reducing on-peak demand 
and increasing off-peak 
demand. 





on high system stress days, such as peak event days that CPP programs intentionally target.29 
This occurs because the large disparity between on- and off-peak rates that exists in CPP 
programs is not as prevalent in TOU rates. TOU pricing structures are only marginally 
effective at altering electricity demand on critical days because the price differential for TOU 
rates only reflects average marginal cost for peak hours.30
It is on these peak days, when the utility is bumping up against system capacity, that 
shifts in consumption from peak to off-peak periods is most valuable to the utility. The result 
is that TOU plans do flatten the load profile for the utility, but the price signal is insufficient 
to significantly flatten the load on the highest demand days.  
   
 
3.3.4 TOU Results 
 
 In 2006, Xcel Energy rolled-out a pilot program that included a TOU program. In the 
study, TOU rate structures resulted in a demand response of just -5.19% during peak 
periods.31 In 2003 and 2004, the three major utilities in California collaborated on a pricing 
pilot that included a TOU plan. Customers were charged 9¢/kWh for off-peak and 22¢/kWh 
for peak consumption compared to 13¢/kWh for the standard rate plan. In 2003, peak period 
demand reduction was found to be 5.9%, but in 2004 there was no measurable reduction in 
peak demand.32
Idaho Power Company implemented a similar pilot program in 2006 and the results 
were also unfavorable. The results of the study showed no shift in electricity consumption for 
consumers who were on the TOU rate plan.
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 The difference between peak and off-peak rates 
in this program was less than 100% (4.5¢ to 8.3¢), which may explain the lack of consumer 
response, but the fact that no demand response was observed is not favorable for TOU plans. 
While these are just a few examples of TOU studies, similar results have been observed in 
other TOU programs.  
3.3.5 CPP/TOU Pilots 
 
Some utilities have implemented pilots that combine the elements of both TOU and 
CPP (or RTP and CPP) with very promising results. There have been a variety of studies 
designed to identify the most effective ways to influence customer demand patterns. In 
general, these studies have indicated that coupling CPP with block rate TOU pricing is highly 
effective relative to the other approaches. One central argument for combining CPP and TOU 
is that TOU plans do not create sufficient incentives to conserve energy on CPP event days, 
while CPP days only address demand during a very small number of days.34
 
 A combined 
CPP/TOU plan addresses peak demand throughout the year as well as during critical peak 
periods. 
3.3.6 CPP/TOU Results 
 
The exact amount of energy savings from a combined TOU/CPP program will depend 





price windows are in place, the amount of increase (in cents) from one price window to the 
next, the presence of an enabling technology, and the extent to which customers have been 
educated about the program. Total energy consumption is likely to decrease by a minimum of 
1-6%.35
There are a number of TOU/CPP pilots that have illustrated the effectiveness of this 
approach versus others. A 2004 pilot involving 250 residential customers from Missouri 
further supports the notion that enabling technology is critical to demand response. In this 
pilot, there were three groups of customers, those subject to TOU rates, those subject to TOU 
and CPP rates, and those subject to TOU and CPP rates with the addition of an enabling 
technology (a smart thermostat). The technology-enabled group demonstrated statistically 
significant reductions in demand during all periods (off-peak, on-peak, mid-peak, CPP), 
whereas the TOU and CPP group without enabling technology only demonstrated 
statistically significant reduction in demand during CPP periods (and less reduction than the 




Another pilot in Washington state further illustrates that combining CPP and TOU 
with enabling technology can lead to significant demand response. In this pilot, the utility 
was able to send price signals to select homes, and consumers were able to pre-program 
demand response preferences. The test groups included a fixed price group, a CPP/TOU 
group, and a RTP group. Both the RTP and CPP/TOU groups saved approximately 30% on 
their electricity bills, but only the CPP/TOU group significantly reduced their overall demand 
(demand reduction was approximately 20%).
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One pilot program by Xcel Energy in the Denver Metropolitan area found that of the 
RTP, TOU, or RTP + TOU, the combination of RTP and TOU pricing led to the most 





3.3.7 Real-Time Pricing 
 
Real-time pricing (RTP) models enable utilities to charge customers the actual real-
time costs of electricity production based on supply and demand. Technological advances in 
metering infrastructure and wireless communication technology have created the ability for 
utilities to communicate real-time electricity price information to its customers. As a result, 
several utilities have launched RTP pilots to test the effectiveness of shifting load from on-
peak to off-peak.  
One shortcoming of real-time pricing is its inability to control or shift loads except on 
those days where demand severely outweighs supply. In general, this imbalance only 
happens on a few extremely hot days each summer, such as CPP event days, where 
households and businesses run their air conditioners extensively. As a result, real-time 
pricing generally only shifts demand or induces conservation for a few hours on a few days 
each year.39
On the behavioral side, it is important for utilities to understand what drives 
consumers to sign-up for this type of pilot and what types of behavior a pilot is expected to 
induce. For the former, research on the ComEd RTP pilot demonstrates that consumers 
joined the program primarily to save money. Environmental reasons were also cited, but to a 
much lesser extent.
 





that their expected savings did not warrant the hassles of switching. Many others believed the 
program to be risky and complex relative to their current price plan.41
 
   
3.3.8 Real Time Pricing Results 
 
From an economic perspective, real time pricing should create the most economically 
efficient consumption patterns of electricity. By charging the actual price of electricity, 
consumers will adjust their demand accordingly and only consume electricity when the 
marginal cost is less than their marginal benefit. In reality, however, RTP by itself has had 
limited success. Despite sending the correct price signals, it is too cumbersome for 
consumers to monitor the constantly moving price of electricity. The result is that consumers 
do not pay attention to the price and adjust their consumption patterns. RTP, however, may 
be an appropriate tool when coupled with enabling technologies. Enabling technologies can 
automate the customer response to the constantly fluctuating price of electricity and have 
been shown to reduce consumer demand. 
Due to the clear issues of consumer’s ability to effectively monitor real-time prices, 
there is limited data on pure RTP programs. Commonwealth Edison, a utility in Chicago, has 
been conducting a real-time pricing pilot since 2003, and several observations have been 
made about the effectiveness of this program. The pilot has demonstrated that participating 
customers are significantly price elastic to electricity prices (an interesting contrast to other 
studies indicating that consumers are price inelastic), and will induce shifts in behavior that 
move electricity demand from on-peak to off-peak periods. Most substantively, a one 
standard deviation shift in price effectively induced 25% of the households to reduce demand 
by 75W. Overall, the program saw a drop of 100-200W during daytime hours, which equates 
to a 5-14% load reduction.42
 
   
In 2006, Community Energy Cooperative in Illinois unveiled a large-scale RTP 
program. This was not a true RTP program as prices were set at the day-ahead rates and did 
not adjust to the actual rates at the time of consumption. Additionally, consumers were 
notified by phone whenever prices rose above 13¢ per kWh. During the highest priced day, 
consumers under this program reduced their consumption 15% compared to consumption 
under standard electricity tariffs.43
 In 2006, the Pacific Northwest GridWise Testbed Demonstration unveiled a RTP 
program in the state of Washington. This program was a true RTP program as customers paid 
the market rate for electricity and the price was adjusted every five minutes. Consumers were 
outfitted with smart-metering equipment that allowed them to adjust their demand 
automatically given the current rate of electricity. Consumer preferences were set using a 
web interface and could be overridden at any time. Customers under the RTP plan reduced 





RTP customers did not reduce their overall energy consumption indicating that this rate 






3.3.9 Peak-Time Rebate (PTR) Programs & Results 
 
These programs offer a rebate to customers who reduce their electricity demand on 
critical peak days when compared to a reference level on a non-CPP day. Southern California 
Edison conducted a pilot PTR program in the summer of 2005. This PTR program offered 
consumers 35¢ for each kWh reduction below a reference consumption level. Customers who 
enrolled in this rate plan were found to reduce their demand by 12% compared to the control 
group on critical peak days.45
 Ontario Energy Board also tested a PTR program from 2006 to 2007. Similar to the 
SCE program, this tariff gave a rebate of 30¢ per kWh for reduction on critical event days 
compared to a reference on a non-event day. The PTR program resulted in a shift of 17.5% of 
demand on critical event days to off-peak hours as well as a 7.5% reduction in demand.  
 
 While the number of experiments on PTR programs is limited, preliminary studies 
support their effectiveness at reducing demand. The perception of a PTR program (receiving 
money) instead of a CPP program may also be a useful characteristic of these programs. 
While the data on these programs are limited, DTE should seriously consider a PTR program 
as a part of its demand response pilot.  
 
3.3.10 Green Power Programs 
 
According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, over 850 utilities offer 
green power programs that serve over 600,000 customers.46 Green power programs allow 
consumers to pay a premium on their electricity rates to ensure that their electricity is coming 
from renewable resources such as wind, solar, hydro, biomass, and landfill gas. Despite the 
downturn in the economy, green power sales increased by 20% in 2008 compared to the prior 
year.47
Although demand-shifting programs like TOU and RTP do not source energy 
specifically from renewable resources, there may be opportunities to brand these as green 
programs. Many of the power plants that serve peak demand periods are inefficient 
generating facilities with high emissions factors. By shifting consumption from peak periods 
to off-peak periods, the higher-emissions plants will have less uptime, possibly resulting in 
emissions reductions. The validity of this “green” argument, however, is not clear and 
requires an analysis of the marginal emissions rates of the power displaced compared to the 
marginal emissions rate of facilities operating during off-peak periods, as well as possible 
changes in overall electricity consumption. For example, a study by the University of 
California Energy Institute found that time varying prices would result in increased emissions 
of SOx and NOx, but decreased emissions of CO2.
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Given the growth and popularity of green power programs, DTE should consider the 
possibility of marketing demand-shifting rate programs as an environmental choice. 
However, a careful analysis of the shift in supply and overall change in electricity 
consumption should validate the authenticity of these claims. 
 With the majority of base-load power 
supplied by coal generation facilities, and peak load power served by natural gas plants or 
coal in Michigan, a shift of consumer demand from peak to off-peak may not result in 






4 Dynamic Pricing and Technology 
 
Almost all residential electricity consumers have electricity meters that measure only 
total electricity consumption. With no infrastructure in place to capture the time at which 
people are consuming electricity, utilities are unable to implement dynamic pricing 
programs.  
In the 1990s, the development of communications technology led to the creation of 
automated meter reading (AMR) technology. AMR was a significant upgrade from 
traditional analog meters, allowing utilities to collect consumption data by wireless 
transmission as the meter readers walked or drove by the houses. However, AMR was still 
limited to collecting cumulative electricity consumption and did not differentiate 
consumption by time of day.  
Further advancement in communication technology led to the development of 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The characteristics that define AMI include 
continuous available communications, interval measurement, dynamic pricing, information 
to the customer, frequency of transmittal, and information to the utility.49 These 
characteristics are defined below.50
 
 
Continuous Available Communication – The utility will be able to communicate with 
the metering device at any time through a fixed network. Through the available 
communication protocol, the utility may be able to collect data and change the 
measurement parameters of the meter. 
 
Interval Measurement - AMI devices collect electricity usage data on time intervals. 
At a minimum, this data should be divided into hourly intervals. 
 
Dynamic Pricing – Using data from interval measurements, AMI should be able to 
implement dynamic pricing plans including RTP, TOU, and CPP. 
 
Information to the Customer – AMI should allow for information to be provided to 
the customer that enables dynamic pricing programs, including information about 
consumption and current prices. 
 
Frequency of Transmittal - An AMI should be able to transmit information to the 
utility at least daily. Devices may also allow transmittal of information directly to the 
customer. 
  
In addition to these characteristics, AMI are now typically compatible with a 
communication standard like ZigBee that can be used to communicate with and control 
electronic devices within the household. This is an important component of the 
implementation of demand response programs as this communication standard allows 
consumers to program either an automatic shut-off or a reduction of the energy consumption 
of home loads during periods of peak energy prices. AMI alone does not allow this 
functionality; additional “smart” in home devices are required. Consumers often do not 
change their behavior when faced with dynamic electricity pricing due to cognitive market 





effectively reduce consumption. Standards like ZigBee can help overcome this barrier to 
dynamic pricing programs, by automating the behavior change. 
Despite the benefits of AMI, deployment has been slower than many people expected. 
The deployment of these devices faces many barriers including the cost of the devices, 
uncertainty in device and communication standards, and uncertainty whether utilities may 
include the cost of the devices in their rate base. However, with the recent announcement by 
President Obama to deploy 40 million smart meters, as well as the growth of revenue 
decoupling, AMI seems poised for large-scale deployment into the market.  
Michigan in general, and DTE specifically, appear to be ahead of the curve in this 
regard. In July of 2008, Itron OpenWay signed a contract with DTE to provide 2.6 million 
electric meters over the next six years. Itron’s AMI technology provides capability for 
interval data collection, TOU metering, remote disconnect, outage detection, net metering 
capability, and ZigBee home network connectivity. 
 
5 Attributes of Successful Demand Response Programs 
 
In order to inform recommendations to DTE as to which tariff programs should be 
considered for upcoming pilots, we consolidated information learned from previous pricing 
pilots, many of which are discussed above. The following section outlines factors that are 
important in designing a successful demand-response program:  
5.1 Enabling Technology Improves Demand Response 
 
It is well documented that enabling technology increases demand response. 
According to a comprehensive 2008 Price Elasticity of Demand for Electricity by EPRI, a 
key conclusion is “there appears to be considerable potential for deploying enabling 
technologies to foster greater price response, perhaps surpassing what can be achieved by 
complex pricing plans51.”  Furthermore, according to the Brattle Group’s 2009 Household 
Response To Dynamic Pricing Of Electricity—A Survey Of The Experimental Evidence, 
“Across the range of experiments studied, time-of-use rates induce a drop in peak demand 
that ranges between three to six percent and critical-peak pricing tariffs induce a drop in peak 
demand that ranges between 13 to 20 percent. When accompanied with enabling 




5.2 What is Enabling Technology? 
 
Enabling technology, by definition, is “equipment and/or methodology that, alone or in 
combination with associated technologies, provides the means to generate giant leaps in 
performance and capabilities of the user53
1. To automate control of their load consumption according to specific price and time 
ranges 
.”  More narrowly, with respect to dynamic pricing 
and demand response, enabling technology is some combination of hardware and software 





2. Transparency into electricity prices 
3. Knowledge of individual and household load electricity consumption levels  
 
5.2.1 Enabling Technology Devices 
 
There are several devices and software programs and platforms that are considered enabling 
technologies for demand response programs. A brief overview follows: 
 
1. Advanced Electric Meter (AMI): 
1.1. An electric meter, new or appropriately retrofitted, which:  
1) Is capable of measuring and recording usage data in time differentiated 
registers, including hourly or such interval as is specified by regulatory 
authorities,  
2) Allows electric consumers, suppliers and service providers to participate in 
all types of price-based demand response programs, and  
3) Provides other data and functionality that address power quality and other 
electricity service issues. 
2. In Home Display: 
2.1. A digital display (typically employing Zigbee technology) that allows consumers to 
closely track their electricity consumption and receive messages or alerts from their 
utility provider 
3. Smart Thermostat 
3.1. A digital device that provides the user with the capability to monitor HVAC energy 
consumption, respond to fluctuations in electricity prices and manage energy loads. 
The user can dictate how the thermostat should behave in the presence of various 
price tiers as well pre-set household heating and cooling levels for different times of 
the day. 
4. Web Based Consumer Portal 
4.1. A browser-based Internet portal that enables the user to monitor, manage and control 
the energy consumption and each of the smart devices in your home. It allows the 
user to receive information and pricing signals from the utility and compare usage to 
neighbors. 
5. Smart plug / Smart Appliance 
5.1. An electrical outlet / appliance that allows the user to measure and control the energy 
consumption load plugged into outlet 
5.3 Targeting High Consumption Homes May Be an Effective Strategy 
 
The California Statewide Pricing Pilot from 2003 and 2004 demonstrated that CPP 
programs can be effective at reducing demand. That study also demonstrated, perhaps not 
surprisingly, that high-use customers decrease their demand the most on CPP event days (one 
additional note here is that those people with the lowest demand benefited the most 
economically, in percentage terms, from the CPP program). As a result, a program targeting 
high-use customers may be more cost-effective than a rate targeting all customers because 





event days. It is important to differentiate between electricity usage and income level. While 
there may be a positive correlation between the two, it is important to highlight that response 
to CPP is consistent across income levels (i.e. low-income, high-usage customers respond 
identically to high-income, high-usage customers).54
The results of a 2008 CPP study of Pacific Gas & Electric customers were consistent 
with the results from the 2003 and 2004 statewide program described above. Specifically, it 
demonstrated that the largest users saved the most amount of energy for the utility; customers 






5.4 Larger Differential Between Peak and Off-peak Rates Leads to Greater Savings 
 
It may seem intuitive that, for TOU rates, the higher the peak price, the greater the 
overall customer savings. Nonetheless, this is a critical point to consider when designing 
pilots. For example, a 1997 TOU pilot in New Jersey detailed that higher prices incentivize 
greater savings. In the pilot, customers faced three different rates, specifically off-peak, 
shoulder, and peak rates. The “high shoulder/peak” groups faced prices of 6.5¢, 17.5¢, and 
30¢, whereas the “low shoulder/peak” group faced rates of 9¢, 12.5¢, and 25¢, respectively. 
The high rate design group saved 50% over and above the low rate design group during the 
peak and shoulder periods. Clearly, a high price differential between peak and off-peak rates 
is important to influencing consumer responses. 
An additional outcome of the New Jersey pilot was that, following CPP events, usage 
during off-peak and shoulder periods was substantially higher relative to a control group not 
subject to CPP pricing.56
5.5 Marketing and Education 
 
 
One message that is consistent throughout the pilots is the importance of educating 
customers about the programs and about the steps that each customer can take to reduce 
consumption. Customers may be inclined to think that they cannot curtail demand, meaning 
education about strategies for demand reduction is essential to the success of a pilot.57 This 
issue relates in part to the fact that customers typically cannot decipher what leads to 
increases or decreases in consumption simply by reading a typical electric bill.58
Numerous successful pilots have had marketing and educational components geared 
toward signing-up customers and then educating them about the rate structures they will face 
as well as about strategies that can be used to reduce demand. In many ways, education and 
marketing is a condition to having a successful pilot. The New Jersey pilot discussed above 
used a financial incentive ($75-$100) to participate in the pilot, and many of the pilots 
involved free installation of the enabling technology. For the 2008 PG&E CPP program 
discussed above, customers were offered $50 Visa cards to sign up, and they were presented 
with a welcome packet as well as directions on how to save energy. Further, PG&E’s 
program guaranteed its customers that they would not see a bill increase, at least for the near 
term. Bill protection could be an important lever to use because it provides risk-averse 









5.6 Customer Notification 
 
Customer communication methods are critical to the success of CPP programs. The 
PG&E study highlighted that there are likely some limits to the percentage of participants 
that are successfully notified; PG&E’s success rate rose from 65% on the first event day to a 
consistent success rate of 80-85%. This success rate indicates that there may be a small, but 
important minority of customers that will be unreachable on any given event day. Hence, a 
certain number of customers cannot be relied upon to respond to critical peak events.61
PG&E notified customers via phone calls (either voicemail or live person reached) 
and email, but other methods could be explored. Doctor’s offices have found success, for 
instance, by text messaging reminders to patients the day before appointments.
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5.7 Bill Protection 
 
 
A challenge facing utilities trying to enroll customers in demand-response pricing 
programs is the concern consumers have that their rates will go up. In response to this 
concern, many utilities offer bill protection for their customers who enroll. A typical bill 
protection program will refund any customers whose electricity bills rise under a demand 
response tariff (over a 12-month commitment period). After an initial period, the customer 
typically is no longer eligible for bill protection refunds. Southern California Edison63 and 
San Diego Gas and Electric64
5.8 Experimental Design 
 are just a couple of several utilities that have offered bill 
protection programs for customers who enroll in demand response rate plans. 
 
The results of previous demand response programs described above provide direction 
for DTE’s upcoming pilots. However, the most important information will come from the 
results of pilots themselves, so careful experimental design will be crucial to the success of 
the demand response program chosen. This may sound like common sense, but consumer 
electricity demand is driven by numerous factors and effectively controlling for all of these 
factors to isolate the effects of demand response tariffs is challenging. 
 
6 Conclusion from Literature Review and Research 
 
The findings from our research provide an overview of the results of previous 
demand response tariff programs and of the important factors to consider when designing 
pilots. Based on this research, we developed eleven pilots that we believe could provide 
meaningful shifts of residential electricity usage. This paper will only forecast actual demand 
shift for four of these pilots due to the intensive nature of the analysis. However the 
methodology used can be replicated in future research for the other pilots. 
Among these eleven pilots, six are conventional designs; they include CPP, CPP with 
enabling technology, TOU with enabling technology, TOU / CPP with enabling technology, 
PTR with enabling technology, and RTP with enabling technology. All of these programs are 





Renewable Energy, TOU/CPP Block Rate Pricing, and Point Rewards – are innovative in 
that they have not previously been tested. These programs are described in detail below. 
 
6.1 Staggered CPP 
 
CPP has been heralded for its ability to curb electricity demand during peak periods, 
and the pricing structure is effective for numerous reasons. First, the CPP window is 
relatively short (4-7 hours) and only occurs a few days a year. This makes it easier for people 
and companies alike to shift their demand to off-peak for just a few hours each year and 
therefore does not demand a shift in habitual energy use. Second, the electricity users are 
given a warning about the CPP event through different means such as text messages, email, 
and website postings. People are notified of the event, and are prepared to curtail their usage 
during the peak times. 
Of course, CPP programs can be improved upon. Research shows that on event days, 
electricity usage is reduced substantially at the outset. In other words, demand is greatly 
reduced in the first couple of hours of the on-peak window. However, as the CPP event 
progresses demand reduction is reduced during the last several hours relative to the first few 
hours of the window. 
There is an opportunity for DTE to create a new pricing structure that creates a win-
win situation for both the electrical consumer and the utility. Staggered CPP windows would 
enable the utility to shorten the event window for individual customers, while improving 
upon the amount of demand reduced. This would be done by creating shorter, but staggered, 
CPP windows for different customers. In addition, prices for this shorter window would be 
increased over and above what they would have been for a longer event window. This further 
incentivizes customers to curb their electricity usage during these shorter peak times.  
For example, customers A, B, and C will all have their windows shortened to three-
hour blocks, instead of six. However, A’s CPP window will run from 2-5pm, B’s from 3-
6pm, and C’s from 4-7pm. Because of the shorter period of time, and the higher CPP, we 
would expect to see a significant reduction over the customer baseline. 
DTE could further refine this pricing structure by offering different CPP pricing 
based on the CPP window chosen. We would expect residential users to prefer having their 
CPP window in the middle of the day, as opposed to the early evening when people arrive 
home from work. As a result, DTE could charge more money, either via a flat rate or per 
kWh, for the CPP windows that are in higher demand. 
Overall, consumers are expected to be happier with a shorter CPP event window, 
especially if they are able to choose the window. Similarly, DTE can expect to see a greater 
percent reduction on event days than would have occurred using a traditional CPP program. 
Results from Brattle show that by doubling the CPP price from 50 cents to $1.00, CPP 
reductions increase from 24% to 32%.  This increase in savings may support the validity of a 
staggered CPP approach.  (See Appendix G –Tariffs and Expected Demand Reductions 







6.2 CPP Subsidizing Renewable Energy 
 
The structure of this program is identical to a typical CPP program, but it incorporates 
concepts taken from DTE’s GreenCurrents program. For instance, a portion of the CPP rate 
could be set aside to fund renewable energy. If the critical peak rate is $0.50 per kWh, then 
an additional surcharge could be designated specifically to fund renewable energy or energy 
efficiency investments. The benefits of such a program include incentivizing environmentally 
conscious customers to participate and educating consumers about the importance of shifting 
demand from on-peak to off-peak.  
 
6.3 TOU/CPP Block Rate Pricing 
 
 This program is designed to incent conservation with consumers facing increasing 
prices the more energy they consume. The structure of this program is similar to that of TOU 
and CPP programs in that prices vary depending on whether use occurs during off-peak, 
shoulder, on-peak, or critical peak periods. However, prices increase not just based on time 
of use, but also based on total amount of energy consumed during a day or month. 
 As an example, during a critical peak period, the first 10 kWh of electricity on any 
given day may be $0.50 per kWh whereas the next 10 kWh would be $1.00 per kWh. The 
blocks could be monthly instead of daily, meaning use during critical peak periods of less 
than 100 kWh in any given month could be $0.50 per kWh while any use in excess of 100 
kWh in a month would be $1.00 per kWh. Block rates could be applied not only to critical 
peak periods but also to on-peak periods. Again, such an approach could further incentivize 
conservation by consumers. 
 
6.4 Point Rewards 
 
Rewards programs in various industries have been in use since the late 1800s, and 
have generally been used as a type of loyalty program.65
DTE has the unique opportunity to offer a points program to its customers for curbing 
electricity consumption during peak times, and shifting load to off-peak times. The program 
would work by offering a specified number of points during every hour of the summer that 
DTE wanted consumers to reduce demand. For example, the hours between 1pm and 6pm on 
critical peak days would be rewarded with the largest number of points. So, when a customer 
reduces demand below some base level for three hours of that day, the customer would 
receive the specified number of points. 
 These programs, made famous by 
the airline industries, have had great success at building customer loyalty and at incentivizing 
customers to purchase more of one company’s product. Recently, points programs such as 
the mileage programs used by airlines, have been adopted by other industries to promote a 
desired behavior. For example, RecycleBank was founded on the premise of rewarding 
people with points for recycling.  These points can be redeemed at a variety of participating 
vendors. 
The base level could be calculated in many different ways. However, prior studies 





method for establishing a base line. This average should be multiplied by 1.25 to provide 
additional “room” over which the consumer can reduce demand.66
Points could be redeemed for various types of prizes such as airline tickets or 
merchandise. In addition, DTE could partner with various venues throughout Michigan so 
that high point scorers could receive better hospitality treatment such as a separate line at 
various stadiums. This creates publicity for the program while giving the largest demand 
reducers public recognition for their efforts. DTE could partner with one of the many credit 
card companies that already run similar reward programs to take advantage of their 
knowledge and ability to manage the program. 
 In other words, the utility 






 In consultation with DTE, we conducted an in-depth evaluation of three of the eleven 
pricing programs discussed above. We selected these three pricing programs based on 
feedback provided by DTE about their level of interest in the different programs as well as 
our judgment about the feasibility of actually modeling the different programs (because some 
of the programs are novel, there is limited data on which to build assumptions about potential 
for demand shifting and/or conservation). Our team and DTE mutually agreed to evaluate 
TOU, TOU/CPP, and TOU/PTR, and it was further agreed that we would perform scenario 
analyses for these pricing programs by evaluating the significance not just of the pricing 
programs themselves, but also of other factors such as level of demand response (high, 
medium, or low), presence of enabling technology, and demand-response pricing penetration 
level (high, medium, or low). We determined that a scenario-based approach was the best 
way to address uncertainty in the model. 
 
 There are two primary elements to this in-depth evaluation. First, to determine 
potential energy and cost savings associated with implementing various pricing programs, we 
built a dispatch model to approximate supply as well as residential electricity demand in 
MISO and then used the model to calculate the impact that certain pricing programs would 
have on residential demand. Second, we developed specific scenarios that could be fed into 
the model to test uncertainty. 
 
The sections that follow provide detail about the model and the specific parameters of 
the scenarios we developed.  
  
7.2 The Model 
 
 Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 depict the structure of the MISO dispatch model that 
we used in the analysis. The model is designed to simulate hourly supply and demand within 





of electricity. Figure 5 depicts the modeling of our base case scenario in which no demand 
response pricing program is deployed. Figure 6 shows how we incorporate the elements of 
demand response pricing programs into the model. Figure 7 shows how we compare 1) the 
cost of electricity generation and 2) emissions levels with and without demand response 
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7.2.1 Data and Methodology 
 
We collected data for all MISO power plants from the Emissions & Generation 
Resource Integrated Database (eGRID).67 This data includes power plant name and location, 
nameplate capacity, capacity factor, fuel type, heat rate, and emissions levels. Power plant 
equivalent availability factors (EAFs) were taken from the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC).68
 Power plant fuel sources included nuclear, coal, natural gas, oil, hydro, landfill gas, 
wind, solar, and biomass. To calculate the marginal cost, or supply, curve within each ISO, 
we used the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2010 
Reference Case fuel price forecasts for coal (AEO 2010 Table 15), natural gas (AEO 2010 
Table 13), and oil (AEO 2010 Table 12).
 The EAF for a power plant adjusts that plant’s available 




 Data for other fuel sources was not needed 
because power plants with such fuel sources typically bid-in at $0 due to either the zero fuel 
cost or the high expense of operating below capacity. 
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7.2.2 Calculating Supply 
 
The dispatch model uses supply and demand forecasts to calculate the wholesale price 
of electricity for each hour of each day from 2010-2030. To arrive at the marginal cost curve, 
we took the following steps. 
 
1. We began with power plant nameplate capacity 
2. Multiplied by  
a. the EAF for coal, nuclear, natural gas, municipal solid waste, biomass, 
landfill gas, and oil plants,a
b. the average of the 2004 and 2005 (the most recent years available) 
capacity factors for wind and hydro facilities from eGRID
 or  
70
3. Multiplied by the forecast fuel price (converted into $/MWh), and 
  
4. Added SO2 costs ($/MWh) based on emissions levels for each plant (SO2 
prices are assumed to remain constant at recent price levels of approximately 
$200 per ton).  
 
See sample calculation in Appendix D.  
 
7.2.3 Calculating Demand 
 
On the demand side, for baseline information, we used actual load data for the past 12 
months from MISO and applied growth rates as projected by MISO to approximate a 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. 71,72 To estimate demand reduction that could occur as a 
result of various dynamic pricing programs, we assumed that dynamic pricing would only 
impact the portion of demand that is used by residential customers (since we assume that the 
dynamic pricing programs will focus on residential electric use). MISO load data is 
aggregated by total demand, including residential, commercial, and industrial customers. As 
a result, it is necessary to isolate the residential part of the load. To do this, historical average 
household load data for DTE customers was multiplied by the number of residential 
customers in the MISO service territory.73
 
 The resulting product (Residential Demand, or 
RD), subject to certain growth rates, yields the expected residential load for a given day and 
hour in future years. 
7.2.4 Calculating the Cost of Generation 
  
The cost of generation for any given hourly time period was calculated by estimating 
total demand in a given hour and then multiplying by the marginal cost of generation at that 
given level of demand. There are some important ways that our model differs from actual 
ISO dispatching. ISOs dispatch power plants based on locational marginal prices (LMPs); 
                                                 
a NERC does not publish EAFs for municipal solid waste (MSW), biomass, and landfill 
gas (LFG) facilities, so we used the EAF for natural gas as a proxy due to the fact that 





buyers and sellers submit bids and offers for each 
hour of the day at various nodes throughout the 
transmission network. Sellers receive the market-
clearing price, meaning that if the last generating unit 
needed to meet demand at a particular node in any 
given hour offered its electricity at $60 per MWh, all 
sellers would receive that price and all buyers would 
pay that price. Total costs for electricity at that 
specific time on that particular node would therefore 
be $60 multiplied by the total number of MWhs 
required to meet demand.74
 
 Because our model is 
designed to capture macro-level impacts of dynamic 
pricing programs (as opposed to calculating prices at 
various nodes on the grid), we match overall supply 
in MISO with overall demand in MISO to arrive at hourly market-clearing prices for MISO 
as a whole. 
Figure 8 outlines the basic mechanics of supply and demand within an ISO service 
territory and how prices are set in a given hour. The hypothetical leftward shift in the demand 
curve demonstrates how a reduction in demand from dynamic pricing can lead to a lower 
market-clearing price (and lower total costs of electricity), given the shape of a typical 
electricity supply curve (labeled S below). 
 There are other aspects of the MISO markets that are not addressed in this paper; as 
an example, in MISO, there is a day-ahead energy market, a real-time energy market, and a 
financial transmission rights market (FTRs). Buyers and sellers meet on these markets, and 
MISO oversees the auction process while ensuring that energy supply is secure and reliable. 
The day-ahead market is the primary market on which load is scheduled. The real-time 
market serves to smooth any imbalances, with LMPs clearing every 5 minutes, and FTRs are 
mechanisms to hedge against transmission congestion.75
 
 Again, because the goal of our 
project is to identify macro-level impacts, we did not address these specific features of the 
MISO market in our model. 
7.2.5 Calculating the Savings Associated with Demand Response Programs 
 
The cost savings derived from demand response programs result from:  
1) avoided energy costs 
2) avoided generation capacity 
 
In the simplest terms, the model calculates the energy produced under “normal,” 
business-as-usual circumstances (i.e. with no demand response program) and the cost to the 
utility to procure that amount of electricity. It also calculates the projected energy produced 
under a demand response scenario. The difference between these two production estimates 
and their associated costs represents the potential savings associated with that demand 
response program. 





Once the new demand levels are calculated by hour, total energy costs can be re-
calculated. The difference between the total cost of energy before and after applying the 
various demand response scenarios represents potential energy savings from these programs. 
Additional savings from pricing programs comes from avoided capacity costs. For 
instance, if a pricing program reduces the absolute peak demand, there is a savings associated 
with not needing as much standby capacity as would have been needed with a higher 
absolute peak. The cost of this capacity is assumed to be $80/kW-year, a proxy used by the 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory to represent the carrying cost of a simple-cycle, 
natural gas peaking plant.76
In addition to avoided energy and avoided generation capacity, demand-response 
pricing will result in avoided transmission and distribution cost.
 
77 Due to the complexity of 
modeling transmission and distribution, our model does not look at avoided transmission and 
distribution costs. However, for reference, a study by the Brattle group found that avoided 
transmission and distribution costs accounted for 22% of the savings from dynamic pricing 
programs.78
7.3 Scenario Inputs 
     
 
As discussed above, scenario inputs include level of demand-response pricing 
penetration, level of demand response (discussed in detail above), and presence of enabling 
technology. The sections that follow describe the specific scenarios that are used in the 
model. 
 
7.3.1 Demand-Response Program Penetration 
 
An important variable in determining the potential gains from residential demand 
response programs is the deployment rate of demand–response pricing programs. As 
discussed earlier, the rate of AMI deployment has been much slower than many people 
anticipated, and demand-response rate programs have touched just a small fraction of 
electricity customers. While recent federal support for smart meters and the growing 
acceptance of their benefits is likely to increase the rate of AMI deployment, there is still 
considerable uncertainty surrounding estimates of how quickly demand-response pricing will 
penetrate the residential electricity market.  
In order to determine the effect of various demand-response pricing deployment 
schedules, our model uses three different scenarios. The “medium” scenario correlates with a 
deployment of demand-response pricing to one percent of households per year. This scenario 
is based on discussions with DTE and their expectation that demand-response pricing will be 
deployed to 10% of residential customers in ten years (by 2020). The “low” scenario deploys 
demand-response pricing to .5% (5% total by 2020) of residential customers per year and the 
“high” scenario to 2% (20% total by 2020) of households per year. In our model, these 
penetration rates increase through 2030, reaching 10%, 20%, and 40% for the low, medium, 






7.3.2 Generation Expansion 
 
Load and capacity in MISO are projected to expand over the modeled time period 
from 2010 to 2030, and the model assumes that capacity expands in line with various MISO 
forecasts. For the base-case generation capacity expansion we used a reference case from a 
transmission-planning document, which MISO considers a “status quo” scenario that takes 
into account, for example, existing legislation and RPS requirements.79
In addition to the reference generation expansion, MISO also forecasts generation 
expansion under a 20% RPS mandate as well as under a carbon tax scenario, called 
“environmental growth scenario.” Using the same methodology as in the reference case, we 
model generation expansion under the 20% RPS mandate and the environmental growth 
scenario. 
  This forecast is 
specific to the year 2024, so we expanded capacity of the various generation asset-types 
linearly to meet the 2024 forecast, and then continued to expand capacity at the same linear 
rate through 2030. 
The model allows for analysis of demand response programs under any of the three 
capacity expansion scenarios. 
 
7.3.3 Carbon Price 
 
The model can incorporate a carbon price into the calculation of the marginal cost of 
generation for all generation plants in the supply stack. Using data from EGRID on CO2 
emissions per MWh for each generating facility in MISO and multiplying this by a forecasted 
carbon price we obtain a marginal cost per MWh of CO2 emissions for each generating 
unit.80  We use carbon price forecasts from the EPA’s analysis of the American Clean. 
Energy Security Act of 2009.81
 
 All scenarios are run without a carbon price unless explicitly 
indicated.   
7.3.4 Program Type and Level of Demand Response 
7.3.4.1 Overview 
 
The next step in the process is to calculate by how much the residential load will 
decrease as a result of the demand response program. Accurately forecasting how consumers 
will respond to a demand response program is a difficult task given all of the influencing 
variables. There are 2 key components that are needed to calculate overall demand response 
levels: 1) customer response levels in peak periods 2) amount of customer response that is 
shifted to off-peak periods (the remainder is assumed to be conservation). 
 
7.3.4.2 Presence of enabling technology 
 
One key piece of this analysis is that some of the program types incorporate enabling 
technology and others do not. To estimate the cost associated with those that do incorporate 





get a range of prices for high volume purchases of enabling technologies by utility 
customers. Because prices are proprietary to these vendors, we obtained prices under Non-
Disclosure Agreements. The estimated costs we received ranged from $300 to $500 for one 
time start-up costs and $25 - $35 for annual operating costs per residential customer. We 
used an average of these ranges in our model calculations, and we assumed costs do not 
decrease over time. The per customer start-up costs includes costs for an In-Home Display 
(IHD), IHD installation, a Programmable Communicating Thermostat (PCT), PCT 
installation, and an initial software fee. The per-customer operating costs included an annual 
software fee and a service fee. These costs are included in the modeling of all Program Types 
that incorporate enabling technology. 
 
7.3.4.3 Customer Response Levels 
 
There is significant empirical evidence that consumers will adjust their electricity 
usage in response to price changes. A compelling conclusion is that a wide variety of 
consumers exhibit price response when provided an opportunity to do so.82 The relative tight 
bunching of elasticity estimates from a variety of dynamic pricing pilots, involving different 
customer segments under different market circumstances, suggests that price response 
impacts can be estimated quite confidently and accurately.83
Table 1
 More specifically, 15 dynamic 
pricing experiments were examined yielding the results summarized in .84
 
 
Table 1 – Mean Residential Customer Response from Previous Demand-Response Pricing Pilots 
.  
It is important to understand that these results signify the peak period consumption 
reduction between the treatment and control group. Hence, assuming 1) the peak period was 
2:00 pm – 6:00 pm 2) the rate design was a “CPP w/ Tech,” and 3) a critical event day was 
called, then if the control group consumed 10 kWh during this 4 hour window, the treatment 
group, on average, would consume 36% (3.6 kWh) less, or a total of 6.4 kWh. 
However, changes in electricity consumption induced by a dynamic pricing rate 
design can vary based on numerous variables including: 
 
1. Rate Design 
2. Price elasticity of individual household (s) 
3. Availability of and type of enabling technology 
4. Ownership of central air conditioning and / or swimming pools 





6. Ratio of on-peak to off-peak and / or shoulder prices. 
7. How often prices change,  
8. Time of the day 
9. Season of the year 
10. Customer education initiatives 
11. Amount of advanced notice of peak events and medium used to communicate peak 
event 
12. Health of the economy in general 
13. Availability of substitutes 




18. By definition, price response is not constant along a linear demand curve 
19. Short Term vs. Long Term (allowing consumers to change their capital stock).85
 
 
7.3.4.4 Load Shifting and Conservation 
 
There are several important dynamics to consider when estimating the electricity 
consumption changes associated with a dynamic pricing rate plan. One key dynamic is 
electricity conservation versus shifting. In a dynamic pricing rate plan, the customer 
experiences peak prices that are higher than previous peak prices and off-peak prices that are 
lower than previous off-peak prices. An increase in electricity price during the peak period 
can realistically induce one of four responses: 
 
1. No change in consumption (perfectly inelastic) 
2. Conservation – a reduction of overall electricity use (some level of own price 
elasticity) 
3. Shifting – a reduction of electricity use during some time period (high price period), 
but that reduction is fully offset by an increase in electricity use during some other 
time period (low price period) indicating some level of substitution elasticity. 
4. Both Conservation and Shifting 
Understanding the relative levels of each of these four responses is important in 
assessing the value of dynamic pricing for the company and end consumer, and for the utility 
to properly plan demand response into its capacity and demand forecasts. The following 
example seeks to illustrate the importance of this dynamic. In Table 1 above, we see the 
range of the peak period consumption reduction in response to several different rate designs. 
These results reveal key information, but not the whole picture. These results tell us the % 
reduction during the peak period, but not what happens to the kWh reductions. Potentially, 
they are conserved and not consumed in another time period. For example, a light that is 
turned off during the peak period is not needed later in the day or evening. In effect, this 
energy was conserved because it was simply never used. If the energy is not conserved, it is 
simply shifted and consumed during another time period. For example, people delay running 





For a utility to best design least cost operation, it needs to understand how much 
electricity will be conserved at different price signals and how much electricity will be 
shifted. To take shifting one step further, the utility needs to understand exactly what time 
periods the reduced load will be shifted to. To better illustrate, assume there is a TOU / CPP 
with four rates:  1) a low off peak rate 2) a mid shoulder rate 3) a higher on peak rate 4) a 
very high critical peak rate. Table 1 tells us that, on average, we expect a 36% kWh demand 
reduction during the critical peak period (when an event has been called). If the control group 
consumed, on average, 10 kWh during the critical peak event, the treatment group, on 
average, consumed 36% less (6.4 kWh) during the same period. Table 1 specifically does not 
tell you if this reduction by the treatment group was “conserved” or “shifted” or both.  
The utility wants to know how much of this reduced consumption is attributed to 
conservation (will not be consumed at some other time period) and how much is shifted 
(consumed during other time periods). Knowing this is not enough. They also want to be able 
to dissect the “shifted” portion of the load and know during what hours that reduced load will 
be shifted to within the off-peak or shoulder periods. Actually calculating the expected shift 
versus conservation and deriving when the shifted load would be consumed is difficult. 
Conservation vs. shifting as a concept is well understood, but the aforementioned 
calculations represent gaps in the literature. 
7.3.4.5 Level of Demand Response Methodology (including Shifting and Conservation) 
 
We used the results from the Brattle Group’s study of empirical evidence from 
residential demand-response pricing, shown in Table 2, to determine peak and critical peak 
period consumption reduction for the corresponding rate design. We then used these results 
to project demand reduction using three scenarios (“high,” “medium,” and “low”) for each of 
the different pricing structures analyzed; the goal was to generate a range of possible demand 
reductions. The “medium” scenario is the mean response seen in all previous studies, the 
“high” scenario is 20% greater than the mean expectation, and the “low” scenario is 20% less 
than the mean expectation. The demand response during critical peak events used in these 
scenarios is shown below in Table 2 while the demand response used in peak periods is 
shown in Table 3. These demand reductions during peak periods are applied uniformly across 
all hours of the peak period in the model. 
 







Table 3- Low, Medium, and High Demand Response Scenario Values during Peak Periods 
 
 
To determine the portions of the peak load shifted to off-peak periods, we used the 
mean results of the change in off-peak consumption from previous pilots. Consolidated 
results of mean customer response during off-peak periods were not found in the literature, 
so we looked at the results of individual studies to estimate the off-peak demand response of 
residential customers.b
Table 4
  This change in consumption was applied uniformly across off-peak 
hours (All hours outside of the peak period). This is an oversimplification of how consumers 
will actually respond, but is a reasonable assumption to use before empirical data is gathered 
from DTE’s pilot studies. The off-peak response was manipulated to create a “low,” 
“medium,” and “high,” demand response scenario using the same methodology described 
above for critical peak and peak time reductions. The final values for customer response 
during off-peak periods used in the model are shown below in  (note that these figures 
represent increases in electricity consumption, whereas the peak and critical peak figures in 
Table 2 and Table 3 above represent decreases in electricity consumption. The expected shift 
in off-peak consumption is something that is not well documented in the literature, and so we 
believe there is a high level of uncertainty surrounding these estimates.  
 
Table 4 – Low, Medium, and High Demand Response Values during Off-Peak Periods 
 
 
                                                 
b Off-Peak results based on the following studies: California ADRS, California Statewide Pricing Pilot, XCEL experimental 





The underlying assumption behind the methodology of using the results of previous 
residential demand-response pricing pilots is that the key variables of the DTE pilot will be 
similar to previous pilots, thus DTE can expect similar demand response in their demand-
response program. The benefit of this method is its relative simplicity; however, due to 
different characteristics of previous studies such as rate designs, demographics, and regional 
climate, it is likely that the DTE population will behave in a manner that is not identical to 
the mean results from previous studies. The high, medium, and low response rates are meant 
to address some of this uncertainty. 
 
7.3.5 Alternate Demand Response Methodology 
Toward the end of our project, an opportunity emerged for DTE to engage the Brattle 
Group to calculate customer demand response levels tailored to DTE’s service territory. 
Because we recognized the potential for improved accuracy associated with the Brattle 
Group’s methodology, as compared to using mean demand response levels from previous 
pilots, we pursued this opportunity. Timing did not allow for us to perform as much analysis 
utilizing the Brattle Group data as we performed utilizing the mean response data outlined in 
Section 7.3.4. However, we were able to conduct a preliminary analysis of the Brattle Group 
data and found that customer demand response levels appear substantially lower than those 
that we modeled. A discussion of these findings and results can be found in Appendix F - 
PRISM Model Simulations, Appendix G –Tariffs and Expected Demand Reductions Using 
Prism Simulation, and Appendix H – Financial Modeling Results of Selected Tariffs from 
PRISM Simulation.  
 
7.3.6 Modeled Scenarios  
 
 Based on the inputs described in Sections 7.3.1 – 7.3.4, we ran the following 
scenarios to arrive at the results described in Section 8 below: 
 
1) TOU, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case Generation 
Growth, No Carbon Price 
2) TOU/Tech, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
3) TOU/CPP, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
4) TOU/CPP/Tech, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
5) CPP/TOU/Tech, Low Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
6) CPP/TOU/Tech, High Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
7) TOU/Tech, Low Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case Generation 
Growth, No Carbon Price 
8) TOU/Tech, High Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case Generation 





9) TOU/Tech, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, 20% RPS 
Mandate, No Carbon Price 
10)  TOU/CPP, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, 20% RPS 
Mandate, No Carbon Price 
11)  TOU/CPP/Tech, Medium Demand Response, Low DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
12)  TOU/CPP/Tech, Medium Demand Response, High DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
13)  TOU/PTR, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Base Case 
Generation Growth, No Carbon Price 
14)  CPP/TOU/Tech, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, 20% RPS 
Mandate, No Carbon Price 
15)  TOU/Tech, Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, Environmental 
Growth Scenario, Carbon Tax 
16)  TOU/CPP/Tech - Medium Demand Response, Medium DR Penetration, 
Environmental Growth Scenario, Carbon Tax 
 
The Program Type (CPP, TOU/Tech, etc.) dictates which demand response levels we utilize 
for modeling purposes. As an example, for TOU/Tech with Medium Demand Response 
levels, we use the values listed in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 under TOU/Tech Mean 
Scenario. For TOU/Tech under High Demand Response, we use information from the same 
tables listed under TOU/Tech High Scenario. 
 
7.4 Additional Data - Defining Peak Periods and Event Days for the Model 
 
The peak period under a demand response pricing tariff should be large enough to 
ensure that it captures all of the peak demand hours during a year, but not so long that it 
inhibits customer response to the increased tariff. As Ahmad Faruqui states “The on-peak or 
critical peak periods should be kept as short as is possible while still reasonably spanning the 
period during which the system peak occurs. A shorter peak period makes it easier for 
customers to shift load to the off peak period when demand reductions are not as critical.”86
 
  
Figure 9 below shows the load profile within MISO for the 5 highest demand days in 
2009. As can be seen in the figure, the absolute annual peak demand level occurs during the 
hour ending at 2:00 pm (hour 14) on June 25 and at 4:00 pm (hour 16) on June 24. In order to 
span this range during which the peak event may occur, we have designated the peak period 









In addition to the designation of the peak period, CPP and PTR programs typically 
have a maximum number of event days that may be called. During these event days, 
electricity in the peak period will be priced at the CPP rate, or customers will be given 
rebates under a PTR program. A review of previous demand-response pilots found that a 
maximum of 8-10 event days was typical. Our model designates the ten highest demand days 
during the summer in each year as critical event days. Table 5 shows the ten days that are 
designated as critical event days, the corresponding peak load, and the time (hour ending) 
during which the peak load was observed in 2009 in MISO. 
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Using the dispatch model described in the previous section, we analyzed demand 
response scenarios 1-16 (listed above in Section 7.3.6) within MISO. Each demand response 
scenario was compared to a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario; in the BAU scenario, each 
element of the scenario remains the same except for the fact that there is no demand response 
program in place. As an example, in Scenario 16 (listed in Section 7.3.6), the BAU scenario 
calculates energy costs and capacity needs under an Environmental Growth and Carbon Tax 
Scenario (the other components of that scenario all relate to demand response programs, 
hence they are not included in the BAU scenario). The model then calculates energy and 
capacity savings (see Section 7.2.5 above) associated with adding the demand response 
elements to that scenario (i.e. that the program type is TOU/CPP/Tech, that the demand 
response level is medium, and that there is medium DR penetration). 
The results from the modeling provide the total cost savings for the MISO system. 
DTE comprises approximately 20% of the MISO system, and so the impact to DTE will be 
approximately 20% of the savings and cost of deploying demand-response pricing estimated 
by the modeling exercise. 
At a high level, deployment of demand response programs under the base-case 
assumptions detailed in the Section 8.2 result in financial outcomes ranging from a net loss of 
$350 million for a TOU tariff with technology to a net gain of  $400 million for a CPP/TOU 
tariff without technology. $400 million represents a savings of less than 0.25% of total 
wholesale electricity costs from 2010-2030 and of less than 1% of the residential portion of 
total wholesale electricity costs from 2010-2030. Our modeling, however, shows that 
increasing the peak period window length to five hours significantly increases the value of 
demand response programs, especially those with enabling technology. Using a five-hour 
event window, financial outcomes range from a net loss of $50 million for a TOU with 
technology to a net gain of $450 million for a CPP/TOU program. A CPP/TOU with 
technology tariff using a five-hour event window results in net benefits of $210 million. If 
the event window lengths are increased to eight hours, net benefits increase further, ranging 
from $419 million for a PTR program to $557 million for a CPP/TOU with technology 
program. The benefits of a tariff with an eight-hour window, however, may be overstated as 
customers’ ability to maintain demand reduction for such a long time period may be limited. 
A summary of the results from scenarios associated with various peak hour windows can be 
found in Appendix E. Note that aside from the differences in peak hour window lengths, 
these scenarios use base-case assumptions detailed in the Section 8.2 below. 
As might be expected, changes in the levels of deployment of dynamic pricing 
programs as well as changes in the levels of customer demand response have significant 
impact on the overall cost savings. Other notable results from the modeling exercise include 
that emissions levels are not significantly impacted by demand response programs, and that a 
large deployment of wind within MISO has little overall impact on the savings associated 






8.2 Comparing Programs under Base Case Assumptions 
 
Our initial analysis looked at the five different demand response pricing programs 
under base-case assumptions. The results of this exercise show that TOU with enabling 
technology and TOU/CPP with enabling technology will result in the largest cost savings for 
DTE resulting in a cost reduction of approximately 0.30%. However, if DTE must bear the 
cost of enabling technology, the cost savings of these programs are actually negative (i.e. a 
financial loss), changing to -0.14% of total energy cost. This indicates that the enabling 
technology providers may be capturing most of the financial gain from deployment of 
enabling technology and DTE should thus use caution in estimating its financial gains due to 
enabling technology deployment and also in negotiating prices. Additionally, DTE should 
strongly consider the option of rate-basing enabling technology, or having customers 
contribute to the cost if it wishes to proceed with deployment of enabling technology.  
 
The assumptions used in our base-case modeling include the following: 
 
1) Medium demand response penetration (see Section 7.3.1) 
2) Mean demand response levels reported in previous programs (see Section 7.3.4) 
3) Base-case generation forecasts from MISO (see Section 7.3.2)87
4) No carbon tax (see Section 
 
7.3.3) 
5) 5% Cost of Capital (this assumption is held constant throughout all scenarios) 
6) 4-hour peak period from 1:00 pm – 5:00 pm (See Section 7.4) 
7) 10 Critical event days for CPP and PTR tariffs (See Section 7.4) 
 
Table 6 lists the results of this initial analysis. The results indicate that TOU with 
technology and TOU/CPP with technology offer the largest potential cost savings for MISO 
and DTE. However, this savings is more than offset by the cost of deploying enabling 
technology. 
Table 6 - NPV of Cost Savings of Various Demand Response Pricing Tariffs in MISO 
 
 
As mentioned above, DTE comprises approximately 20% of MISO, and applying this 
percentage to the cost savings within all of MISO provides an estimate of the cost savings 


































TOU $11 $94 $105 -$          $105 0.05% 0.20%
TOU/PTR $50 $300 $350 -$          $350 0.16% 0.66%
TOU/CPP $39 $360 $399 -$          $399 0.19% 0.75%
TOU w/Tech $174 $399 $573 ($925) ($352) -0.17% -0.66%









Table 8 shows the distribution of cost savings between avoided energy savings and 
avoided capacity savings under the base case scenarios. Of particular note is that TOU with 
technology and CPP/TOU with technology tariffs result in a higher percentage of savings 
from avoided energy. The reason for this is that with a four-hour peak period and the high 
demand response rate of consumers under these rate plans, the hours adjacent to the 1:00 pm 
– 5:00 pm peak window end up with higher demand than what used to be the peak hour of 
demand (See Figure 10 below). Once demand in the hours adjacent to the peak window 
surpasses demand in the event window, annual avoided capacity savings will no longer 
increase, but avoided energy savings continue to grow. 
 
 



























TOU $2.2 $18.8 $21.0 $0.0 $21.0 0.05% 0.20%
TOU/PTR $10.0 $60.0 $70.0 $0.0 $70.0 0.16% 0.66%
TOU/CPP $7.8 $72.1 $79.9 $0.0 $79.9 0.19% 0.75%
TOU w/Tech $34.8 $79.7 $114.5 ($185.0) ($70.5) -0.17% -0.66%








TOU 11% 89% 100%
TOU/PTR 14% 86% 100%
TOU/CPP 10% 90% 100%
TOU w/Tech 30% 70% 100%
TOU/CPP w/Tech 31% 69% 100%






Figure 10 - Modeled avoided capacity savings using 4, 5, and 6 hour peak event window in 2030 with 
CPP/TOU w/ tech 
8.3 Changing the rate of demand-response penetration 
 
One of the central goals of our analysis was to identify the effect of changing the 
penetration rate of demand-response programs. In particular, we were interested in whether 
the cost savings from demand response will continue to grow in a linear fashion, for 
reasonable levels of demand-response penetration, or if there are diminishing or exponential 
returns. Based on our analysis, the gains from avoided energy continue to grow in an almost 
linear fashion for levels of demand response penetration up to double the base case levels 
(e.g. 2% of residential customers in 2010, 4% in 2011, increasing to 40% by 2030). 
However, using a 4-hour peak period, there are diminishing avoided capacity gains with 
more demand response penetration for the programs with high levels of customer response. 
As described in the previous section, in the deployment of a CPP/TOU with technology 
program, the hours adjacent to the 1:00 pm - 5:00 pm window become the peak hours once a 
sufficient number of customers are enrolled in demand-response pricing. Once this occurs, 
annual avoided capacity savings are very limited and in fact will be diminished with further 
deployment of demand-response pricing because further demand-response pricing will 





















Peak Demand By Hour in 2030 Under Base Case and CPP/TOU/Tech
With Various Peak Period Lengths
Base Case
4 Hour Peak (1pm - 5pm)
5 Hour Peak (12pm - 5pm)




Period Avoided Capacity 5 & 6 
Hour Peak 
Period
Demand Response Scenarios Run with 
the following criteria
1) Demand Response = Medium
2) D.R. Penetration = Medium
3) Generation Growth = Base Case
4) No Carbon Price
4- Hour Peak Window
5- Hour Peak Window










8.4 Level of Demand Response 
 
In previous demand-response pricing pilots, there has been a wide range of observed 
responses by customers. Until DTE obtains data from its initial pilots, there will be 
significant uncertainty surrounding the level of demand response that will be realized. This 
section of the analysis looks at the sensitivity of the financial gains of demand response 
pricing to the level of demand response of customers. Under these scenarios, “medium” 
demand response is the mean level of response seen in previous studies. “Low” is a 20% 
reduction in response from the “medium” scenario, and “high” is a 20% increase in response 




























Annual Demand Response Penetration Rate (%)








Table 9 - NPV of Cost Savings under Low, Medium, and High Demand-Response Scenarios
 
 
The results of this modeling exercise indicate that the financial returns to demand 
response pricing are highly sensitive to the level of demand response (see Table 9).  While 
predictions can be made using the price elasticities of DTE’s customer base, wide variations 
of responses in previous studies indicate that this may be a challenging exercise. Given the 
sensitivity of the cost savings to the level of demand response, DTE should use the pilot 
pricing programs to collect detailed information about how customers respond to the new 
tariff structures. This should include a thorough analysis of own-price elasticity and the 
elasticities of substitution between all hours of the day. Only through empirical analysis of its 
specific customer set can DTE be fully confident in how its residential customers will 
respond to dynamic pricing programs. The results from the Brattle Group analysis for 
example (discussed in Appendix F - PRISM Model Simulations, Appendix G –Tariffs and 
Expected Demand Reductions Using Prism Simulation, and Appendix H – Financial 
Modeling Results of Selected Tariffs from PRISM Simulation) indicate that customer 
response rates within DTE’s service territory may be significantly lower than the response 
rates modeled to arrive at the results found in Table 9. Of course, this has a significant impact 
on the NPV of savings, as is outlined in Appendix H.   
8.5 Pollution Implications of Demand Response Pricing 
 
One of the questions surrounding demand response pricing programs is whether such 
a program will increase or decrease emissions. This is of particular concern in a market like 
MISO in which base-load power is supplied by coal generation facilities while peak demand 
periods may be served by natural gas generation facilities (as discussed below, within MISO, 
peak demand periods may be served by coal facilities as well). Thus, shifting a portion of 
peak demand from peak to off-peak periods may actually increase emissions by substituting 
electricity from a natural gas generation unit for electricity from a coal generation unit. 
The results in Table 11 below illustrate the impact of demand-response pricing on 
emissions within MISO from 2010 - 2030. As can be seen in the table, demand response may 
actually decrease emissions within MISO. This result is likely due to the fact that for the 
majority of days, peak demand is actually served by coal generation facilities. This result 
from the model is supported by FERC’s classification of coal as the marginal fuel type within 
MISO.88
 
 Thus shifting electricity consumption from peak to off-peak periods is actually 
shifting generation to a more efficient, relatively cleaner coal facility. This effect, coupled 
with pricing-induced conservation from demand response, appears to offset the increase in 









Table 10 - Pollution Implications of Demand Response Tariffs under Base-Case Scenarios 
 
 
Although our modeling shows emissions reductions of up to .08%, there are several 
factors that may affect whether this result is stable. In particular, the level of demand on the 
MISO system in the future as well as the actual observed shifting of residential customers 
within MISO will impact these results. Given the depressed level of demand in MISO due to 
the economic downturn, only a small subset of hours is served by natural gas generation 
facilities. If demand were to rebound, demand response pricing may begin to shift generation 
more frequently from relatively clean natural gas facilities to dirtier coal generation facilities, 
reversing the pollution implications in our model. Additionally, if DTE’s customers respond 
very differently to demand-response pricing compared to the results seen in past pilots, there 
may be a significant impact on the pollution implications of these programs. 
 Despite these variables, demand response may play a small role in emissions 
reductions for DTE. Although .08% emissions reduction may not seem significant, it is 
important to note that these emissions reductions result from deploying dynamic-pricing to 
just a subset of residential customers, meaning the vast majority of residential customers as 
well as all commercial and industrial customers are not subject to dynamic pricing. Because 
residential demand comprise approximately 25% of total demand in MISO, residential 
demand response pricing is influencing just 5% of total system load in the year 2030 under 
this modeling scenario. When considered from this perspective, the emissions reductions 
from residential demand response pricing are not insignificant and may warrant more 
aggressive deployment of demand-response pricing within MISO. However, overall impact 
on emissions is small and demand response pricing should not be considered a substitute for 







8.6 Impact of a 20% RPS Mandate 
 
The electricity industry is highly dependent on policy mandates, and Renewable 
Portfolio Standards are certain to influence generation expansion within MISO. Using the 
MTEP planning forecasts discussed above (Section 7.3.2), we modeled the effect of 
generation expansion under a 20% RPS mandate and the resulting implications on demand 
response pricing programs.89
 The addition of wind resources to meet the 20% RPS standard has the effect of 
shifting the supply curve to the right. 
 
Figure 13 shows the modeled supply curve under the 
base case scenario 





comparison of the 
financial returns to 
various demand 
response pricing 
programs under the 
base-case generation 
growth scenario and a 
20% RPS mandate. 
The results indicate 
that savings from 
residential demand 
response programs 
are not highly sensitive to 
whether a renewable portfolio 
standard within MISO shapes 
future generation capacity 
expansion. The reason that 
savings is not highly sensitive 
to this shift is that demand 
rarely approaches the steep, 
expensive part of the supply 
curve within MISO. Because 
demand does not often hit the 
steep portion of the supply 
curve, there is little impact 
from shifting the supply curve 
to the right. Hence, there is not 
a significant impact on overall 
savings. 
 
Figure 13 - Forecasted Supply Curve in MISO Under Base Case and 
20% RPS Scenarios 





Table 11 - NPV of Cost Savings under Base Case and 20% RPS Scenarios 
 
 
One shortfall of the model is that it uses a constant value of $80 per kW-yr as the cost 
savings from avoided capacity. This is why the 20% RPS mandate has no impact on the 
avoided capacity savings as modeled. It is possible that the generation expansion under the 
20% RPS scenario may affect the cost of generation capacity, but this is beyond the scope of 
this project. 
 
8.7 Effect of a Carbon Tax 
Another policy that will have significant effect on the electricity industry is a carbon 
tax. In order to determine the impact of a carbon tax, we used the generation growth forecast 
under an environmental scenario in the MTEP planning forecasts and applied carbon price 
forecasts from the Environmental Protection Agency.90
Figure 14
 A carbon tax will increase the cost of 
carbon-based electricity generation and reduce the cost difference between coal and natural 
gas (See ). Due to the reduced spread between coal and natural gas costs under a 
carbon tax, we hypothesized that this would reduce the benefit of demand response pricing 
by reducing the cost differential between peak and off-peak electricity. However, our results 
indicate that the carbon tax actually increases the financial impact of demand-response 
pricing (See Table 12).  
 These results indicate that because coal is typically the marginal plant in MISO, the 
carbon tax actually magnifies the financial gains from demand-response pricing by making 
the supply curve steeper. This increase in financial impact more than offsets the reduction in 
financial gain (due to the reduced spread in cost between coal and natural gas) when natural 















Table 12 - NPV of Cost Savings under Carbon Price Scenario 
 
 
Once again, our model uses a standard value of avoided capacity savings of $80 per 
kW-yr and thus avoided capacity savings are not impacted by the presence of a carbon price.  
In reality, a price on carbon may have an impact on the cost of generation capacity, but this is 







































9 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
9.1 Summary 
This project’s original goal was to provide DTE with specific demand response 
tariffs, prices, and corresponding expected net economic benefits from wide scale 
deployment. To accomplish this, we used the results of previous demand response 
pricing programs to identify the tariff structures that appeared most suitable for wide-
scale deployment within MISO. We selected programs that had been piloted several 
times and had shown to effectively reduce peak period electricity demand. The pricing 
structures selected for in-depth research and simulation within our constructed 
dispatch model were TOU and TOU/CPP, with and without the presence of enabling 
technology (i.e. programmable communicating thermostat or in-home display) and 
TOU/PTR. Using the mean demand reductions exhibited by customers who faced these 
demand response tariffs in previous pilots, we simulated the potential financial and 
emissions implications of deployment of demand-response tariffs in MISO using a 
dispatch model of the independent system operator.   
 Additionally, through our investigation of the key attributes of successful 
demand response programs, we created several ideas for new types or permutations of 
demand response tariffs. The key findings of our analysis follow. 
 
9.2 Key Findings 
 
1. Combined TOU and CPP programs with or without enabling technology 
provide the greatest demand response in the residential electricity market. 
Based on our comprehensive review of past pilots from around the world, we 
found that TOU/CPP programs with or without enabling technology consistently 
outperform all of the other dynamic pricing tariffs that have been piloted. Not 
only does this program lead to demand shifts from peak to off-peak, but also 
offers consistent conservation and net reduction in energy use. Further, this 
combined tariff structure performs well with or without the use of enabling 
technology, though the response is better with the use of enabling technology. 
2. Enabling technology, specifically the programmable communicating 
thermostat and in-home display, substantially improves customer demand 
response. However, the cost of hardware, software and ongoing maintenance 
of the enabling technology appears to be greater than the NPV of the 
additional savings associated with using the enabling technology. As noted in 
all of the previous pilots, enabling technology does greatly improve the overall 
impacts of demand response and significantly increases the savings in both 
avoided capacity and avoided electricity for the utility. However, the high price 
tag of enabling technology, including the in-home unit and ongoing operational 
costs, more than offsets these savings. As a result, the investment by the utility in 
enabling technology does not yield a positive NPV project. Instead, dynamic 





enabling technology will provide the highest economic benefit. However, if a 
utility is able to incorporate the cost of the enabling technology into the rate base 
or somehow have customers contribute to the costs of the enabling technology, 
then enabling technology could be very valuable. 
3. Costs savings to the utility are dominated by avoided capacity savings. Our 
model totaled the savings to the utility for each demand response program. For 
simplicity, we limited those savings to avoided capacity and avoided energy costs. 
The results show that in every dynamic pricing tariff, the avoided capacity 
savings significantly outweigh the savings from avoided energy costs. 
4. The length of the CPP window is an important driver in overall cost savings. 
Depending on a utility’s service territory, peak demand can occur at different 
times of the day. Simulations suggest that short CPP windows, such as four hours, 
do not provide sufficient room to guarantee that peak demand will occur within 
this window. Furthermore, short windows may cause peak demand to occur in the 
periods adjacent to the CPP window, which virtually eliminates all of the avoided 
capacity savings that are achieved with longer CPP windows of 5 or 6 hours.  
5. The financial gains from the deployment of residential demand response 
using a four-hour peak window represent, at most, approximately 0.25% of 
the total cost of wholesale electricity from 2010-2030 and approximately 1% 
of the residential portion of wholesale electricity costs. While there is some 
variation in savings based on changing the mix of variables in the scenarios we 
discussed, all scenarios yielded savings that were well under 1% of total energy 
costs. One potential reason for the limited savings is that the MISO area has 
experienced significant economic hardships since 2009. This along with other 
factors has contributed to an overall reduction both in peak demand and in the 
amount of time throughout the year that MISO approaches the very steep parts of 
the supply curve, times during which demand response efforts likely yield the 
biggest savings. 
It is important to note that changes in the length of the peak window, as 
outlined in Appendix E, and substantial differences in the level of demand 
response, such as that observed in the Brattle Group data (outlined in Appendix F 
- PRISM Model Simulations, Appendix G –Tariffs and Expected Demand 
Reductions Using Prism Simulation, and Appendix H – Financial Modeling 
Results of Selected Tariffs from PRISM Simulation), has a significant impact on 







The analysis in this paper demonstrates the potential outcomes of implementation of 
various demand response programs within MISO and DTE. There are many ways in which 
this research can be expanded to improve the granularity of this analysis. In addition, several 
recommendations can be made to DTE based on our modeling of the various tariff structures. 
 
1. DTE should run ProMod with the demand response tariffs and their 
corresponding estimated reductions that produced the greatest economic 
benefits. While we are confident that our results provide a useful estimate of the 
potential range of economic impacts from dynamic pricing programs, it would be 
helpful to compare those results to those from a more sophisticated model such as 
ProMod. We did not have access to such a model, but our scenario assumptions 
could be used in ProMod to provide an additional level of certainty that addresses 
the simplifications highlighted below. 
a. In our model, wind generation and hydroelectric facilities generate power 
uniformly throughout the day. In reality, wind typically generates more 
electricity at night and less electricity during the day. Adding this temporal 
aspect of wind generation may improve the accuracy of the dispatch 
model. In addition, pumped-storage hydroelectric facilities are dispatched 
to maximize their economic value and are more likely deployed during 
periods of peak demand. Adding a mechanism to the model that can 
simulate the choice of deploying or not deploying hydroelectric power 
may also improve the dispatch model. 
b. In order to address the availability of generation facilities for dispatching, 
the model allows plants to generate up to the product of their nameplate 
capacity and their equivalent availability factor. Using this method, all 
plants on the system are available at all times, although they cannot 
generate their full nameplate capacity. To make this more realistic, the 
model could be extended so that each day individual plants may or may 
not be available to dispatch their full nameplate capacity using a 
probabilistic simulation based on their equivalent availability factors. 
c. The model uses a static value of avoided capacity of 80 $/kW-yr. In 
reality, generation capacity costs are dependent on the interaction of 
supply and demand and thus dynamic in nature. Making avoided capacity 
costs dynamic in the model could improve the model. 
d. The modeling done in this project looked at the MISO system as a whole, 
and not at a more localized level; the modeling did not, for example, 
attempt to calculate locational marginal prices. The electricity grid is 
replete with localized characteristics that may affect the returns on demand 
response including transmission bottlenecks and localized supply and 
demand characteristics. Additionally, the model assumes that demand 
response is rolled out throughout all of MISO. In reality, there will likely 
be some utilities that will begin deployment of demand-response pricing 





2. Model potential savings under a scenario in which demand growth continued 
at historical average since 2008. As noted above, the economic downturn moved 
MISO away from the very steep parts of the supply curve, which significantly 
reduces the economic savings from demand response programs. Analysis with 
greater overall off-peak and peak demand would provide information about 
potential savings from demand response if electricity consumption rapidly 
recovers to pre-recession levels. This scenario could yield substantially different 
results 
3. DTE should use its pilots to test customer response to various dynamic 
pricing structures, various rates within those structures, various peak 
window lengths, and various configurations of enabling technology. There is 
significant uncertainty around the level of demand response that DTE’s customers 
will exhibit under dynamic pricing tariffs. Pilots give DTE the opportunity to test 
for many different variables and track in detail how its customers will respond 
and the corresponding economic benefit DTE will reap in a large scale 
deployment of AMIs and dynamic pricing tariffs. Below, we recommend the 
specific programs and variables for DTE’s pilots. 
a.  Pilot a CPP/PTR with enabling technology, TOU with enabling 
technology, and CPP/TOU with and without enabling technology. Our 
research and the estimated demand response for DTE’s service territory 
conducted by the Brattle Group suggest that these three programs will 
provide the greatest demand response and economic benefit for DTE. 
However, it is unclear which program will provide the greatest benefit 
across various customer segments. Therefore, DTE should conduct pilots 
for all of these across customer segments to determine the best tariff 
structure for their demographic population. 
b. DTE should offer a peak period window of 4, 5 and 6 hours across pilots 
to test for movement and height of the peak. This test will create certainty 
around the window which will create the greatest economic benefit to 
DTE arising from avoided capacity. With a longer event window, enabling 
technology becomes more valuable and a better investment. This added 
technology will enable DTE to further increase its savings from rolling-out 
these new dynamic pricing tariffs. 
c. Pilots should incorporate the features of the most successful pilots already 
conducted across the US as described in Section 5, Attributes of 
Successful Demand Response Programs.   
4. DTE should test two and three hour CPP windows with higher differentials 
to test the viability of a staggered CPP tariff. We believe this tariff represents 
an opportunity for DTE to distinguish itself as a cutting edge utility while 
benefiting economically from this novel price structure. We recommend testing 
the viability of such a tariff using ProMod and DTE-specific customer elasticities 









Appendix A - DTE’s Residential Rate Options 
 
Standard Residential Rates 
 
Residential Electric Service Rate Code: 060 
 
 
Power Supply Charges 
 
 
First 17kWh per day 
 
6.486 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh 3.547 c per kWh 
Service Charge $6.00 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 
Delivery Surcharges and Credits .6824 c per kWh 
 
 
Senior Citizen Residential Electric Service 
Rate Code: 053 
 
 
Available to customers who are age 62 or older, head of household 
and average less than 665 kWh a month. 
Power Supply Charges 
 
 
First 17kWh per day 
 
4.575 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh .969 c per kWh 
Service Charge $6.00 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 




















Customer’s central air conditioning or central heat pump must be 
wired to a separate meter. 
Power Supply Charges 




5.657 c per kWh 
(November – May)  
All kWh 
Delivery Charges 
3.761 c per kWh 
Distribution kWh (Year Round) 3.823 c per kWh 
Service Charge (June-Oct) $1.95 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 




Water Heating Service Rate 
 
 
Customer’s water heater must be wired to a separate meter. 
Controlled Service(Interruptible) 
Rate Code: 007 
Power Supply Charges  
All kWh 
 
3.740 c per kWh 
Delivery Charges  
Distribution kWh (Year Round) 2.833 c per kWh 
Service Charge (June-Oct) $1.95 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 
Delivery Surcharges and Credits .6824 c per kWh 
 
Controlled Service(Non - Interruptible) 
Rate Code: 005 
Power Supply Charges  
All kWh 
 
5.355 c per kWh 
Delivery Charges  
Distribution kWh (Year Round) 2.833 c per kWh 
Service Charge (June-Oct) $1.95 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 






Special Rates for Space Heating 
 
Whole House  
Rate Code: 040 
 
For electrically heated homes 
Power Supply Charges 
(June – October) 
 
First 17kWh per day 6.486 c per kWh 
Additional kWh per day 7.896 c per kWh 
(November – May)  
First 20 kWh per day 6.925 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh (June - October) 3.539 c per kWh 
Distribution kWh (November – May) 2.756 c per kWh 
Service Charge (Jun) $1.95 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 





Special Rates for Time of Day 
 
 
Whole House  
Rate Code: 084 
 
Limited to 10,000 customers. On-peak hours Mon-Fri 11am – 7pm  
Power Supply Charges 
(June – October) 
 
All on-peak kWh  11.550 c per kWh 
All off-peak kWh 3.650 c per kWh 
(November – May)  
All on-peak kWh  9.770 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh (June - October) 4.480 c per kWh 
Service Charge (Jun) $19.00 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 








Space Conditioning, Water Heating, or Electric 
Vehicle 
Rate Code: 032,034,036 
 
Limited to 5,000 customers. On-peak hours Mon-Fri 11am – 7pm. 
This rate is available to customers using geothermal heating and 
cooling 
Power Supply Charges 
(June – October) 
 
All on-peak kWh  9.925 c per kWh 
All off-peak kWh 3.495 c per kWh 
(November – May)  
All on-peak kWh  4.670 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh (Year Round) 1.778 c per kWh 
Service Charge (Jun) 6.70  c per day 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 
Delivery Surcharges and Credits .6824 c per kWh 
 
 
Optional Whole House  (Farm) 
Rate Code: 020 
 
This rate is no longer offered to new customers. On-peak hours 
Mon-Fri 11am – 7pm  
Power Supply Charges  
All on-peak kWh  7.318 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh (June - October) 4.107 c per kWh 
Service Charge (Jun) $6.51 per month 
Power Supply Surcharges and Credits .0009 c per kWh 
















Appendix B – Consumers Energy Rate Schedules 
 
Standard Residential Rates 
 
Residential Electric Service  
Rate: RS 
 
Power Supply Charges 
(June – September) 
 
First 600kWh per month 4.7517 c per kWh 
Additional kWh 8.4687 c per kWh 
(October – May)  




Distribution kWh 2.6082 c per kWh 
System Access Charge $6.00 per month 
Surcharges 4.5 c per kWh 
 
Time of Use Rates 
 
Residential Service Time of Day Secondary  
Rate: RT 
On Peak Hours: 11:00 am – 7:00 pm 
 
Power Supply Charges 
(June – September) 
 
On Peak 8.0012 c per kWh 
Off Peak 4.5532 c per kWh 
(October – May)  
On Peak 5.2654 c per kWh 




Distribution kWh 2.6082 c per kWh 
System Access Charge $6.00 per month 













Appendix C - Additional Rate Structures 
 
Wisconsin Public Service 
 
Regular Customer Rates 
$0.08487 per kWh Current Urban Customer Rate 
$0.08970 per kWh Current Rural Customer Rate 
 
Time of Use Savings Rate 
$0.04491 per kWh Rate for Urban Customers during Time-of-
Use electric savings hours 
$0.04771 per kWh Rate for Rural Customers during Time-of 
Use electric savings hours 
$0.17961 per kWh Time-of-Use rate for Urban Customers 
during peak usage hours 
$0.19082 per kWh Time-of-Use rate for Rural Customers 
during peak usage hours 
 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company 
 
 Standard Rate  Time of Use 
  On Peak Off Peak 
Delivery 
Charge 
3.890 cents/kWh 22.171 cents/kWh 4.243 cents/kWh 
Power Supply 
Charge 
6.716 cents/kWh Included in Delivery Charge 
Total Cost per 
kWh 












Appendix D – Sample Marginal Cost Curve Calculation 
 
Plant name: Warner Lambert 
Location: Michigan 
Fuel Type: Natural Gas 
Nameplate Capacity: 12.4 MW 
Capacity Factor: 24% 
SOx output: .0306 lb/MWh 
Heat Rate: 8500 BTU/kWh 
Fuel Price: $6.42/MBTU 
Equivalent Availability: 91% 
Net Capacity: 11.33 MW 
 
To calculate how this plant fits into the overall MISO marginal cost curve, we first 
multiplied the plant capacity by the plant equivalent availability factor to determine the “Net 
Capacity,” which is 11.32 MW. This means that, on average, the Warner Lambert plant 
provides 11.32 MW of capacity to MISO (Note that for hydro and wind, we use an average 
capacity factor from 2004-2005 eGRID data, the most recent years available, instead of an 
equivalent availability factor. Capacity factors more accurately represent wind and hydro 
availability than do equivalent availability factors due to the intermittent, weather-
determinant nature of these resources).  
To calculate at what price this plant will bid into MISO, we need to calculate 
marginal cost for the plant. This is calculated first by taking the plant’s heat rate (8.5 
MBTU/MWh) and multiplying by the price of natural gas on a specific date. Next, we add 
the cost of SOx by multiplying the SOx price ($/lb) times the emissions rate (lb/MWh) for 
the plant. For Warner Lambert, the fuel cost is $6.42/MBTU x 8.5 MBTU/MWh, or 
$54.57/MWh. The SOx cost is .0306 lb/MWh * $0.10/lb, which, when added to the fuel 
costs, brings the total marginal cost for Warner Lambert to $54.57. 
Of course, this plant is only called upon when demand requires its use. In terms of the 
overall MISO marginal cost curve, this plant would be called upon when demand reaches 
approximately 95,000 MW. Below that level of demand, there are less expensive plants (in 
terms of marginal cost) that are called into use. Most of these plants are coal, nuclear, wind, 
and landfill gas facilities that have very low marginal costs.  
The overall MISO marginal cost curve is computed by doing similar calculations for 





Appendix E – Summary of Results of Various Scenarios 
 
 
Table 13 - Summary Statistics of Tariffs Using Various Peak Window Lengths 
Rate Plan Savings/Cost Type 4-Hour Window 5-Hour Window 8-Hour Window 
CPP/TOU/Tech 
     Avoided Energy  $    194,600,000  $290,000,000  $636,000,000  
  Avoided Capacity  $    438,700,000  $846,000,000  $846,000,000  
  Technology Cost  $   (925,000,000) ($925,000,000) ($925,000,000) 
  Total ($291,700,000) $211,000,000  $557,000,000  
TOU/Tech   
     Avoided Energy  $    174,200,000  $265,000,000  $602,000,000  
  Avoided Capacity  $    398,500,000  $611,000,000  $611,000,000  
  Technology Cost ($925,000,000) ($925,000,000) ($925,000,000) 
  Total  $ (352,300,000) ($49,000,000) $288,000,000  
PTR   
     Avoided Energy  $      50,000,000  $50,000,000  $114,000,000  
  Avoided Capacity  $    300,000,000  $305,000,000  $305,000,000  
  Technology Cost 0 $0  $0  
  Total  $   350,000,000  $355,000,000  $419,000,000  
CPP/TOU   
     Avoided Energy  $      39,000,000  $60,000,000  $122,000,000  
  Avoided Capacity  $    360,000,000  $399,000,000  $399,000,000  
  Technology Cost 0 $0  $0  




Rate Plan Savings/Cost Type 4-Hour Window 5-Hour Window 8-Hour Window 
CPP/TOU/Tech 
     Avoided Energy 31% 26% 43% 
  Avoided Capacity 69% 74% 57% 
  Total 100% 100% 100% 
TOU/Tech   
     Avoided Energy 30% 30% 50% 
  Avoided Capacity 70% 70% 50% 
  Total 100% 100% 100% 
PTR   
     Avoided Energy 14% 14% 27% 
  Avoided Capacity 86% 86% 73% 
  Total 100% 100% 100% 
CPP/TOU   
     Avoided Energy 10% 13% 23% 
  Avoided Capacity 90% 87% 77% 
  Total 100% 100% 100% 
 





Appendix F - PRISM Model Simulations 
 
In the preceding analysis, we utilized peak period electricity consumption changes 
from several previous dynamic rate pilots. However, due to limitations of this method, we 
used an additional approach to estimate consumer response to demand response tariffs which 
incorporates customer elasticities and specific attributes tailored to DTE. The Brattle Group 
modeled DTE consumer response to various demand-response tariffs, the results of which are 
summarized in Appendix H – Financial Modeling Results of Selected Tariffs from PRISM 
Simulation. Due to the schedule of this project we modeled a limited number (3) of the tariff 
structures using the MISO dispatch model used throughout this study. A summary of this 
work is included below. 
As noted above, there are limitations to the approach we used to estimate electricity 
consumption changes based on previous pilots. The most significant limitation is the absence 
of specific price points within each rate design. In the approach described in our paper, we 
looked at the results of several past pilots to determine our expected electricity load changes 
from different rate design categories (e.g. CPP / TOU, PTR, etc.). Within the population of 
past pilots, however, there are several specific price points within each category of rate 
designs. To illustrate this point, consider the following: the mean reduction from a CPP / 
TOU w/ Tech, based on past pilots, is 36% (see Table 1). This mean is derived from the 
results of 8 past pilots, each of which typically has different prices. For example, Pilot One 
could have a critical peak price to off peak price ratio of 10:1 ($0.50 /kWh CPP to $0.05 / 
kWh Off Peak). Pilot Two could have a critical peak price to off peak price ratio of 20:1 
($0.75 /kWh CPP to $0.0375 / kWh Off Peak). By using the mean response (albeit with high, 
medium, and low scenarios), we group all specific price points together (within a specific 
rate design category) and use an average impact to model the expected electricity 
consumption changes included in our model.  
Another approach, hereinafter referred to as “Approach 2,” is to set specific price 
points within each rate design category and calculate the expected impact based on those 
specific price points. Using the same illustration described in the paragraph above and 
holding all else constant, Approach 2 would result in two different estimated load impacts 
because the ratio of CPP to Off Peak price is 10:1 in one and 20:1 in the other. We would 
expect a larger reduction in the 20:1 scenario. 
This is significant in that Approach 2 allows us to estimate the load impacts from 
several different specific price points. The approach used throughout our paper provides us 
only with a range of expected impacts based on classes of rate design categories, but not 
specific price points. Additionally, the results are not specifically tailored to DTE using 
factors such as average load per customer, air conditioner saturation rates, and weather 
patterns. Approach 2 takes the extra step of incorporating this DTE-specific data.  
Finally, the approach used in the paper is limited in understanding how much load is 
conserved versus shifted and, for the shifted portion, to what specific hours the load is 
shifted. Approach 2 addresses this by specifically looking at each rate window (off peak, 
shoulder, and peak / critical peak) and determining the relative increase or decrease in each 
window. 
Note that Approach 2 does not use own price and substitution electricity consumption 





from actual DTE pilots. Because Approach 2 requires elasticities as an input, elasticities from 
a proxy utility that had previously run similar pilots were used (see further explanation 
below) 
To calculate the expected impacts using Approach 2, we enlisted the services of 
Ahmad Faruqui and Ryan Hledik of the Brattle Group in San Francisco. The Brattle Group’s 
methodology is as follows: 
 
“To simulate customer response to each of DTE’s dynamic rate designs, The Brattle 
Group relied on the Price Impact Simulation Model (PRISM).c
PRISM simulates two distinct impacts on customer usage patterns. The first is called 
the “substitution effect,” which captures a customer’s decision to shift usage from higher 
priced peak periods to lower priced off-peak periods. The second impact is called the “daily 
effect” and captures the overall change in usage (i.e. conservation or load building) that is 
induced by differences in the average daily price of the new rate relative to the existing rate. 
The magnitude of these impacts depends on the structure of the dynamic rate that is being 
tested, as well as a number of factors that influence the relative price responsiveness a 
utility’s customers (such as weather, central air conditioning (CAC) saturation, or presence of 
enabling technologies). For example, higher peak-to-off-peak price differentials produce 
greater reductions in peak demand. Additionally, the presence of enabling technology, such 
as programmable communicating thermostats (PCTs) or in-home displays (IHDs) will 
enhance a customer’s ability to respond to price signals, either through automation or 
increased access to usage-related information.  
  The PRISM software 
captures the actual responses of thousands of customers on dynamic rates during several 
recent pricing experiments across North America. The responses from these experiments 
were tailored specifically to DTE’s system characteristics and dynamic rate designs to 
produce likely estimates of load shape impacts for the average DTE residential customer. 
Of the elasticities estimated through recent dynamic pricing pilots, those produced in the 
Baltimore Gas & Electric (BG&E) experiment are likely the most representative of DTE’s 
residential customers. This is due to identical CAC saturations of the two utilities (78%), 
similarly urban service territories, geographic locations east of the Rockies (indicating higher 
summer humidity than the Western U.S.), and similarities in the rate designs and 
technologies being evaluated. Due to these similarities, the residential elasticities from the 
BG&E experiment served as the basis for simulating DTE customer response.  
Note that, for the purposes of this analysis, the IHD is assumed to be an energy orb. 
The energy orb changes colors depending on the price of electricity. For example, the orb 
could be green during off-peak hours, yellow during shoulder hours, red during peak hours, 
and flashing red during critical peak hours. This has the effect of making customers more 
aware of high priced hours and encourages load shifting.d
                                                 
c Recently, PRISM formed the basis for FERC’s “A National Assessment of Demand Response Potential.”  
For more information about the model, see Ahmad Faruqui, John Tsoukalis, and Ryan Hledik, “The Power 
of Dynamic Pricing,” The Electricity Journal, April 2009. 
  The automating technology was 
assumed to be a PCT, which receives a signal directly from the utility and changes the 
thermostat to a pre-specified set point during critical events.” See PRISM Flow Chart below: 
d Note that other types of IHDs that provide more detailed information about usage patterns could affect 








Rate Design Methodology 
 
In Approach 2, we designed many different rates (see summary in table below and 
actual rate designs in Appendix G –Tariffs and Expected Demand Reductions Using Prism 
Simulationto analyze their expected load impacts. Each rate was run through the PRISM by 
the Brattle Group. Below is a summary of the rates the Brattle Group analyzed. 
 




Number of Different 
Rates Analyzed 
CPP / TOU w/ Tech Yes 12 
CPP / TOU   No 7 
CPP and Block Rate w/ 
Tech Yes 1 
CPP and Block Rate No 1 
TOU w/ Tech Yes 10 
TOU No 5 
PTR w/ Tech Yes 7 






In developing the rate designs, we considered the following: 
1. Rate must be revenue neutral. We determined revenue neutrality using the following 
methodology:  we obtained average hourly load data for residential customers within 
DTE’s service territory. We multiplied total average monthly consumption per 
customer by DTE’s current block prices (power supply cost only). This yielded the 
average residential monthly bill for power supply cost. We input the number of peak 
days that can be called by the utility (when applicable with a CPP rate), peak rate, 
shoulder rate and critical peak rate (where applicable). We then used a Solver 
optimization to solve for the off peak rate to set the total monthly bill per customer 
equal to the monthly bill per customer under the existing rate. If the resulting off peak 
rate was negative, or higher than the peak or shoulder rate, we simply adjusted one of 
the inputs until it made intuitive sense. It is the industry standard to assume no load 
change in applying new rates to determine revenue neutrality. 
2. We sought to achieve rate designs that covered a reasonable spectrum of different rate 
categories, different prices within each category, inclusion and exclusion of a 
shoulder period / rate, number of event days that can be called (within CPP rate 
designs), and length of different pricing windows (off peak, shoulder, peak, critical 
peak). 
3. We sought to analyze rates that we determined were easy to understand and would 
not excessively confuse customers. This was largely determined by best practices 
from the literature and our own sense of how we thought consumers may behave. It 
was not a rigorous scientific process. 
 
Results of PRISM Model Simulation 
 
Appendix G –Tariffs and Expected Demand Reductions Using Prism 
Simulationsummarizes the tariff structures modeled using the PRISM model as well as the 
expected demand reductions during critical peak, peak, shoulder, and off peak periods under 
these tariffs.  The results of the PRISM simulations show demand reductions that are lower 
than the mean reductions presented in Table 1from the Brattle Group’s study of previous 
demand response pilots.  The difference between the mean demand reductions from previous 
demand response pilots and those shown in the PRISM model simulation is most profound 
for TOU tariffs.  Given the lower expected demand reductions as modeled using the PRISM 
simulation, we expected lower financial return to demand-response pricing when using these 
expected demand shifts. 
Appendix H – Financial Modeling Results of Selected Tariffs from PRISM 
Simulationshows the expected returns to selected tariffs from the PRISM model simulation. 
These results show financial outcomes ranging from a net loss of $496 million to a net gain 
of $551 million for deployment of the selected rate structures, which is lower than the results 
when using the mean reductions from prior pilots. These results lend further support to our 
conclusion that potential gains from demand response appear limited and that enabling 
technology may not be worth the cost of deployment. However, given the variance of the 
expected demand shifts from the PRISM simulation compared to the mean results of 
previous demand response pilots, DTE should empirically test the response of their 





It is important to note a limitation in the work performed by the Brattle Group.  As 
previously mentioned, Brattle used elasticities from a Baltimore Gas and Electric pilot.  The 
actual load reductions during the peak periods (non CPP events) for the BGE pilot were low ( 
between 1% and 5% depending on the use of enabling technology).This occurred because 
there was not much of a price difference on the non-CPP days in the BGE pilot.  The peak 
period rate was the same as the pre-dynamic pricing rate.  The off-peak rate was of course 
lower but the price differential between peak and off-peak was considerably smaller than in 
some of the other pilots.  The significance of this is that elasticities used in the PRISM were 
from one data point so any variation in actual elasticities by DTE customers, with respect to 
BGE elasticities, would alter the results.  The further signifies the importance that DTE 









Table 15 - Summary of Rate Plans Modeled Using PRISM Simulation 
Consumption Change (%)








Peak Shoulder Off-Peak Peak Shoulder Off-Peak
1 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    7      23    0.02$        0.05$        0.08$        0.50$        -24% 4% 9% -4% 1% 6%
2 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    9      22    0.03$        0.05$        0.09$        1.00$        -32% 4% 8% -5% 1% 4%
3 CPP/TOU 13        18    13    18    9      22    0.03$        0.05$        0.09$        0.75$        -28% 5% 9% -5% 1% 5%
4 CPP/TOU 13        18    13    18    9      22    0.03$        0.05$        0.09$        0.75$        -22% 3% 6% -3% 1% 4%
5 CPP/TOU 13        18    13    18    9      22    0.03$        0.05$        0.09$        0.75$        -24% 4% 7% -4% 1% 4%
6 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.08$        0.50$        -22% N/A 4% -2% N/A 1%
7 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.04$        N/A 0.25$        0.50$        -25% N/A 5% -17% N/A 4%
8 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.04$        N/A 0.08$        1.00$        -32% N/A 6% -4% N/A 2%
9 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.04$        N/A 0.08$        1.00$        -25% N/A 4% -3% N/A 2%
10 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.04$        N/A 0.08$        1.00$        -27% N/A 4% -3% N/A 2%
11 CPP/TOU 13        20    13    20    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        0.20$        -10% N/A 5% -3% N/A 2%
12 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    7      23    0.02$        0.05$        0.08$        0.50$        -14% 1% 4% -2% 1% 4%
13 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    9      22    0.03$        0.05$        0.09$        1.00$        -20% 1% 3% -3% 1% 3%
14 CPP/TOU 13        18    13    18    9      22    0.03$        0.05$        0.09$        0.75$        -17% 1% 3% -2% 1% 3%
15 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.08$        0.50$        -13% N/A 1% -1% N/A 1%
16 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.04$        N/A 0.25$        0.50$        -15% N/A 2% -10% N/A 2%
17 CPP/TOU 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.04$        N/A 0.08$        1.00$        -20% N/A 1% -2% N/A 1%
18 CPP/TOU 13        20    13    20    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        0.20$        -6% N/A 2% -1% N/A 1%
21 TOU -       -  14    18    7      23    0.02$        0.05$        0.08$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -4% 1% 6%
22 TOU -       -  14    20    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.15$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -9% N/A 4%
23 TOU -       -  14    18    7      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -4% -1% 4%
24 TOU -       -  14    18    7      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -3% 0% 3%
25 TOU -       -  14    18    7      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -4% 0% 4%
26 TOU -       -  15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.20$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -13% N/A 3%
27 TOU -       -  15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.20$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -10% N/A 2%
28 TOU -       -  15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.20$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -11% N/A 2%
29 TOU -       -  10    22    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -2% N/A 3%
30 TOU -       -  14    18    7      23    0.02$        0.05$        0.08$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -2% 1% 4%
31 TOU -       -  14    20    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.15$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -5% N/A 2%
32 TOU -       -  14    18    7      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -2% 0% 2%
33 TOU -       -  15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.20$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -7% N/A 1%
34 TOU -       -  10    22    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        N/A N/A N/A N/A -1% N/A 1%
35 PTR 14        18    14    18    7      23    0.04$        0.07$        0.10$        (0.50)$      -24% 3% 8% -4% 0% 4%
36 PTR 14        18    14    20    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.12$        (0.50)$      -25% N/A 5% -6% N/A 3%
37 PTR 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.07$        N/A 0.09$        (0.30)$      -18% N/A 4% -2% N/A 1%
38 PTR 14        18    14    18    7      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        (1.00)$      -31% 3% 8% -4% -1% 4%
39 PTR 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.20$        (0.50)$      -27% N/A 4% -13% N/A 3%
40 PTR 11        17    10    22    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        (0.75)$      -27% N/A 7% -2% N/A 3%
42 PTR 14        18    14    18    7      23    0.04$        0.07$        0.10$        (0.50)$      -15% 1% 3% -2% 0% 2%
43 PTR 14        18    14    20    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.12$        (0.50)$      -15% N/A 1% -3% N/A 1%
44 PTR 14        18    14    18    -  -  0.07$        N/A 0.09$        (0.30)$      -11% N/A 1% -1% N/A 0%
45 PTR 14        18    14    18    7      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        (1.00)$      -19% 0% 2% -2% 0% 2%
46 PTR 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.20$        (0.50)$      -17% N/A 1% -7% N/A 1%
47 PTR 11        17    10    22    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        (0.75)$      -17% N/A 2% -1% N/A 1%
49 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    10    22    0.03$        0.06$        0.09$        1.00$        -20% 0% 2% -2% 0% 3%
50 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        0.50$        -13% 0% 1% -2% 0% 1%
51 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.08$        1.00$        -20% 0% 1% -1% 0% 1%
52 TOU -       -  15    20    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.15$        N/A N/A N/A -5% N/A 2%
53 TOU -       -  15    18    8      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        N/A N/A N/A -2% 0% 2%
54 PTR 15        18    15    20    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.12$        (0.50)$      -15% N/A 1% -3% N/A 1%
55 PTR 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.07$        N/A 0.09$        (0.30)$      -11% N/A 1% -1% N/A 0%
56 PTR 15        18    15    18    8      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        (1.00)$      -20% 0% 2% -2% 0% 2%
57 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    10    22    0.03$        0.06$        0.09$        1.00$        -32% 2% 7% -5% -1% 4%
58 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.09$        0.50$        -23% 0% 3% -3% 0% 1%
59 CPP/TOU 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.08$        1.00$        -32% 0% 4% -3% 0% 1%
60 TOU -       -  15    20    -  -  0.05$        N/A 0.15$        N/A N/A N/A -9% N/A 3%
61 TOU -       -  15    18    8      22    0.05$        0.08$        0.11$        N/A N/A N/A -4% -1% 3%
62 PTR 15        18    15    20    -  -  0.06$        N/A 0.12$        (0.50)$      -25% N/A 4% -6% N/A 2%
63 PTR 15        18    15    18    -  -  0.07$        N/A 0.09$        (0.30)$      -19% N/A 3% -2% N/A 1%
























Rate # Description Avoided Energy Avoided Capacity NPV Cost Savings Technology Cost Net NPV
#1 CPP/TOU w/ Technology ($1,000,000) $375,000,000 $374,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($551,000,000)
#2 CPP/TOU w/ Technology $22,000,000 $407,000,000 $429,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($496,000,000)
#8 CPP/TOU w/ Technology $18,000,000 $372,000,000 $390,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($535,000,000)
#21 TOU w/ Technology ($44,000,000) $97,000,000 $53,000,000 ($924,999,999) ($871,999,999)
#26 TOU w/ Technology $24,000,000 ($64,000,000) ($40,000,000) ($925,000,000) ($965,000,000)
#35 PTR w/ Technology $45,000,000 $386,000,000 $431,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($494,000,000)
#36 PTR w/Technology $2,000,000 $361,000,000 $363,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($562,000,000)
#49 CPP/TOU $3,000,000 $7,000,000 $10,000,000 $0 $10,000,000
#61 TOU w/ Technology $11,000,000 $13,000,000 $24,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($901,000,000)
#64 PTR w/ Technology $58,000,000 ($46,000,000) $12,000,000 ($925,000,000) ($913,000,000)
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